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HISTORY  
OF THE  
**POLITICAL AND MILITARY**  
TRANSACTIONS IN INDIA  
DURING THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE 1017  
**MARQUESS OF HASTINGS**  
1813—1823.

BY HENRY T. PRINSEP,  
OF THE BENGAL CIVIL SERVICE.

ENLARGED FROM THE NARRATIVE PUBLISHED IN 1800.

*Res poscere videtur,—ut non modo casus eventusque rerum, qui plerique fortuiti sunt, sed ratio etiam causeque noscantur. TACITUS.*

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IN TWO VOLUMES.—VOL. I.

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LONDON:  
KINGSBURY, PARBURY, & ALLEN,  
LEADENHALL STREET.  
1825.

## PREFACE.

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THE work published in quarto in 1820, under the title of a Narrative of the Political and Military Transactions in British India, under the administration of the Marquess of Hastings, has formed the basis of the present volumes. The introduction of a particular account of the Nipál War, and the completion of the details of that with the Mahrattas to the taking of Aseergurh, together with the addition of a new and fuller summary of the political and financial result of these operations, have led to the adoption of the more ambitious title now prefixed. In other respects, the present work is only a revised edition of the Narrative.

In the preface to the quarto volume, the Author sufficiently explained the motives which had induced him to publish. A connected state-

bring down the results to the latest period, according to the original design. From what has been stated, however, it will be evident that this part of the work has been executed under great comparative disadvantages.

The author has no longer had the same means of ready reference to official and private correspondence under which it was his boast to have compiled the original narrative. He is sensible, also, that much of the favour, and still more of the credit and authenticity with which his first publication was viewed, were owing to the official situation he then filled, and the intimate relation with the head of the Indian government, in which, from that circumstance, he was supposed to be placed. This certainly is an advantage he cannot claim for any thing new in the present edition; moreover, the distance from his friends, amongst the actors and parties concerned in the events recorded, has deprived him of the power of reference to their judgment and superior intelligence, an advantage of which he before largely availed himself. In the present instance, therefore, the public have the fruit of the Au-

thor's unaided labours; and for any errors or imperfections, or incorrect opinions which may be found, the responsibility is entirely his own.

With respect to the form of publication, it has been the author's aim to place the work as extensively as possible within the reach of those connected with India here or abroad, and to make it as useful as a regard to their convenience and its scope and design have allowed. To have annexed copies of the treaties, and copious notes and references in support of the text, would have had the effect of needlessly swelling the size of the volumes; for the few who require these minute details, can have no difficulty in procuring the entire correspondence as published at the India House, while the abstract contained in the body of the narrative, will suffice for every purpose of general information.

The plans and views introduced into the quarto volume, in illustration of the events of the Mahratta War, have, with exception to the general map of the seat of operations, been omitted in this edition, several of them having

been found to be more or less incorrect, and all greatly inferior to the topographical delineations in the works of Colonel Blacker and Lieutenant Lake, to which any one needing such illustrations may refer. The few, however, having relation to the events of the Nipâl War, are retained, as necessary to show the nature of that country, and its positions, and not to be found elsewhere; one or two additional maps of the seat of operations against that nation, have further been inserted for the same reasons.

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# HISTORY, &c.

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
### INTRODUCTORY MATTERS.

State of India on Lord Moira's arrival—Relations of the British with Native Powers—Alliances, subsidiary protective—disposition towards British—of States subject to their influence—Nizam—Peshwa—other subsidiary Allies—of protected Allies—Independent Powers—Holkar—Sindhia—Nature of their power and administration since 1805—military force—how employed—disposition towards British—Bhoosla—Disposition—General View—Military adventurers not checked or suppressed—Pindarees in 1814—their history—settlement on Nerbudda—mode of warfare—successes—rise of Kureem Khan—his power in 1806—and fall—Cheetoo—Dost Mahommed—Kureem's redemption—second rise—designs, and fall—Durras in 1814—Patans—their power—locality—Relations with Mahrattas and Rajpoots—Amber Khan—his force in 1814.

THE Earl of Moira, now Marquess of Hastings, arrived in India, and assumed the government-general in October 1813. The seven years of his predecessor, Lord Minto's government, had

been employed first in preparing the States of the West to resist the passage of the French, who then were thought to meditate an invasion overland; afterwards in composing the discontents of the Madras army; and latterly, in wresting from the dominion of France, and the Continental Powers under her influence, their remaining insular possessions in the Indian Ocean and Archipelago. Hence this administration produced very little change in the political relations established with the several native powers, during the second government of Lord Cornwallis, and that of Sir George Barlow. Some additional chiefs of Bundelkhund had indeed been admitted to the benefit of a protective alliance; and in 1809 the system of our relations was extended to the Sutlej, by the reception of certain Seikh chieftains also under protection, as a barrier to the rising ambition of Runjeet Singh. Moreover, in 1812, measures of compulsion were undertaken against the Rewa principality, in consequence of this Raja's having aided an incursion of Pindarees into the rich provinces of Mirzapoor and South Buhar. These were, however, still in progress on the arrival of Lord Hastings, and the tract was only finally subjected to our influence by his Lordship. In like manner an attempt made by Lord Minto, in 1808-9, to bring about a subsi-

1840



**Sketch**  
**MAP OF INDIA.**  
*showing the*  
*capitals of independent*  
**STATES.**  
*and the chief towns of Provinces &c*

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diary alliance with the Bhoosla Raja, proved at the time abortive; and though the hope of eventually accomplishing this object was not finally extinguished, the measure was one remaining for the new Governor-General.

With the slight modifications above adverted to, the relations of the British with the native powers of India were precisely in the condition in which they were placed at the close of the Mahratta war, in 1805-6; but the course of events had in this interval produced many important changes, as well in the relative position of the several powers towards one another, as in their temper towards ourselves. It will be useful, by way of introduction to the proposed Narrative of the principal Political and Military Transactions of Lord Hastings's administration, to give a brief sketch of their actual condition at the time of his Lordship's arrival.

The States of India, that is, of Hindoostan and the Dukhun, for external powers, as those bordering on Persia to the west, and the Burmese and others to the east, are necessarily excluded from the review, may be classed at this period under four heads. First, those with whom the British nation had formed subsidiary alliances. Secondly, those enjoying its protection, without any subsidiary contract, and consisting for the most part of small principalities, scarcely meriting the name

of substantive powers. Thirdly, acknowledged princes with whom the British government was at peace, and connected by the mutual obligation of treaties ; but with whom it had no closer intercourse, or recognized means of influence, except in so far as the residence of a British representative at the court was sometimes matter of stipulation. Fourthly, independent chieftains and associations never yet acknowledged as substantive states, and to which the British nation was bound by no engagements whatsoever.

The states connected with the British by subsidiary alliances were, the Nizam, whose court was at Hyderabad in the Dukhun ; the Peshwa, residing at Poona ; the Gykwar, whose capital was Brodera, or Baroda, and who held at one time the greater part of Goozerat ; and the Rajas of Mysoor and Travankoor. The Nuwab of Oudh ought, perhaps, in strictness, to be added to these ; but the cessions exacted of him by Lord Wellesley, in commutation for the stipulated subsidy, had so circumscribed his territory and contracted his means, that although independent in the management of his remaining possessions, and consequently far superior to the pageant courts of Dehlee, Moorshedabad, and Arcot, (Urkât,) he was nevertheless in too great dependence on the British government, to be regarded as one of the political states of India.

All the subsidiary alliances had been formed upon the same principles. The British nation stipulated to furnish a specific force for the protection of the country, and maintenance of the sovereign's legitimate authority. This force was not ordinarily to be employed in the duties of civil administration, nor in the collection of the revenues; and the British government generally agreed not to interfere in such matters. A subsidy, equivalent to the payment of the force, was furnished by the protected state either in periodical money payments, or by territorial cession; more frequently the latter. A certain native contingent, as it was called, was also to be maintained in readiness to act with the British troops, and for the efficiency of this, the protected state was answerable. But the most material provision of the treaties was, that, the states accepting them, engaged to discontinue all political negotiation with the other powers of India, except in concert with the British government; and to submit all claims and disputes with others to its arbitration and adjustment. This article, though an indispensable correlative of the stipulation for protection, gave to the British a controlling power in all matters of external relation; while the obligation to maintain the protected prince's just authority, implied the right of interfering, with advice at least, in matters of internal policy likely to bring it in

question. Hence all the subsidizing states were more or less in dependence,—a reference to the British government being always necessary either to prevent or punish the aggression of neighbours; to quell insurrections, or enforce the submission of powerful vassals, and guarantee their just treatment; or finally, to regulate the succession on a sovereign's demise.

The engagements for the simple protection of chieftainships and principalities had the same controlling character, nor did they differ materially in substance from the subsidiary treaties, except inasmuch as there was seldom any consideration exacted for the protection to be afforded, and never any obligation on the British government to maintain a specific force for the purpose. The principal members of this class were—the Rajas of Bhurtpoor, of Dholpoor Baree, of Alwa or Macheree, and various other chiefs round Dehlee and Agra, with whom arrangements had been made on the close of the Mahratta war in 1805-6. The Rajas of Oorcha and Tehre, of Duttea, of Punna, and others of the Bundeela race,\* together with the Mahratta chiefs of Jaloun and Jhansee, and one or two more taken under protection on the conquest of Bundelkhund, or subsequently; also the Raja of Rewa, in Boghilkhund, and the

\* See the nomenclature annexed to this edition.

Seikh chieftains between the Jumna and Sutlej, to whom allusion has before been made, as added to the list in the time of Lord Minto. The Moosulmán Nuwabs of Rampoor and Kalpee in Hindoostan, of Kurnool and Ellichpoor in the Dukhun, and numberless others, whom it would be tedious to recapitulate, belong also to this class. The two Rajpoot states of Jypoor and Joudhpoor had been included in this system by Lord Wellesley: but in the settlement of 1805-6 they were left without the pale of our relations, from an apprehension that these were already too extensive. The Raja of Jypoor was considered, by his conduct in the war with Holkur, to have forfeited all claim to our further protection; while the Raja of Joudhpoor had refused to ratify the treaty concluded with Lord Lake, by his representative; so that no impediment arose out of any existing engagements with either state, to counteract the desire then felt by the British government to withdraw from the connexion.

When mention is made of the extent of the British influence, in estimating the national power and resources in India, it is in allusion to the states and principalities whose relation with us is of one or other of the above two descriptions. These must by no means be overlooked in such an estimate, for it is one most striking feature of the connexion, generally indeed an express stipulation.

that in case of exigency the whole resources of our ally shall be at the command and under the direction of the British government. It must not, however, be supposed that of the states thus subject to our influence, all were equally well contented with their lot, or ready to afford the aid of their resources with the same zeal and alacrity. Their sentiment towards us was almost as various as the circumstances in which they found themselves placed. Sometimes the connexion originated in motives of ambition or interest, or present necessity; and upon gaining the temporary object sought from the alliance, the restraints it imposed on all schemes of further aggrandizement would render the prince who formed it restless and discontented. Sometimes the British government would, from motives of policy, be compelled to pursue ulterior objects, and urge their acceptance with an importunity very irksome and disagreeable to the ally. § Sometimes the personal character of the prince or his minister, and as often that of the British representative at his court, would lead to irritating disputes and mutual alienation. But a more general source of discontent necessarily existed in the checks imposed, both directly and indirectly, on the gratification of private revenge, capricious cruelty, and other bad passions. Hence it was but seldom that a prince's gratitude and sincere attachment could be depended upon, unless

he owed to us his elevation to power, or came to the Musnud after the establishment of our influence, with moderate views and chastened ambition, satisfied with the undisturbed enjoyment of what he possessed, and well convinced that, but for the alliance, he would not be able to maintain himself in that.

Of the subsidizing states, the Nizam was our most useful ally, and the connexion with him had, from various circumstances, assumed an anomalous character. Nizam Ulee Khan formed the alliance in his old age, not long after he had received a severe defeat from the Mahratta forces at Kurdla, and when the power and ambition of Tippoo was also a subject of constant apprehension to him. There were at the time two parties at his court; one devoted to the French interest, and placing its reliance on the troops officered chiefly by that nation, who, since the convention of Kurdla, had been greatly strengthened; the other attached to the English, and headed by Azim ool Oomra, the prime minister. Nizam Ulee, sensible of his own weakness and increasing infirmities, desired only repose and security for the future. He was readily led to conceive a suspicion of the French party, from seeing the same interest predominant at the court of his rival Tippoo, as well as in most of the Mahratta durbars, and hence fell naturally into the views of his minister; whose anxiety for a

connexion with the British was not, it must be confessed, wholly disinterested. Having brought about the alliance of 1798, the same influence effected the more close connexion of 1800, which secured to us the aid of the Nizam's resources in the approaching contest with the Mahrattas; but this latter measure was rather yielded to the paramount influence of the minister, than adopted by Nizam Ulee from personal conviction of its benefit to his own interests; and, indeed, during the last years of the reign of this prince, the ascendancy of Azim ool Omra was so complete as to enable him to assume the entire direction of affairs at Hyderabad. Upon the death of Nizam Ulee, in 1803, his eldest son, Meer Ukbur Ulee, who in his father's lifetime had the title of Sekundurjah, succeeded to the musnud without opposition. For this advantage, and for the subsequent acquisition of Berar on the close of the Mahratta war, this prince felt indebted to the course of measures adopted by the ministers of his predecessor, and particularly to the connexion subsisting with the British. Being of an indolent habit, and unambitious character, he was well content to leave the conduct of affairs in the hands he found them. The ascendancy of Azim ool Omra therefore continued till this minister's death in 1804. He was succeeded by his relation, Meer Alum, who found his advantage in drawing closer the ties subsisting



with the British government; for it was to its influence mainly that he owed his appointment, and he continually needed its support against the intrigues of his rivals. Meer Alum died in 1808, when the reigning Nizam made a feeble effort to exercise the rights of sovereignty, by the selection of a minister from amongst his personal favourites. The competitors for the vacant office were three: Mooneer ool Moolk, Meer Alum's son-in-law, and a connexion of the Nizam's favourite wife; Shums ool Oomra, commander of the household troops, and a large jageerdar; and Chundoo Lal, a shrewd Hindoo, long employed under the two former ministers, and by far the most capable person about the court. The British government espoused the cause of the last mentioned, and assumed openly, on this occasion, the right of dictating that the minister should be a person in its confidence. After much discussion, the matter was compromised, by leaving to the Nizam the appointment of a nominal premier, on the condition that Chundoo Lal should be the deputy, and the principal never interfere with his administration. After wavering a little, the choice of Ukbur Ulee fell upon Mooneer ool Moolk, the least fit; and in setting aside the other competitor, he is said to have been influenced principally by the discovery that of the two we should have preferred him for the station of nominal chief. The arrangement

here described took effect in 1810; since when, Chundoo Lal has managed all the affairs of this state, while Moonceer ool Moolk passes his time in consulting astrologers, and the Nizam, partly from ill-humour, and partly from indolence and imbecility, refrains wholly from intermeddling. As the necessary result of such a system, the British influence assumed from this time forward *a more confirmed character: the efficient minister* was wholly dependent on its aid for the enforcement of his daily measures and orders; and through him the resources and means of the state took whatever direction was pointed out by our representative at the court. Chundoo Lal was naturally distrustful of the military establishment of the Nizam, and of the chiefs, who wasted the revenues of the state under the system of assignments for its maintenance. Hence he readily adopted a suggestion, which the inefficient state of the contingent gave us the excuse for offering, and consented, as a means of reforming this force, to raise battalions, to be officered and disciplined like British sepoy regiments. In 1814 there were two brigades of this description, whose services, when not required in the field as a contingent, were *most useful in collecting the revenues, and aiding the civil administration; and whose existence gave to the Nizam's government a strength independent of the British subsidiary force, thus*

of implicitly trusting to this aid, he evinced at all times the greatest jealousy of any attempt to cement a closer union. It had been distinctly foreseen by Lord Wellesley, that this prince only entered into the defensive alliance from conviction that "he had no other way of recovering any part of his just authority, or of maintaining tranquillity in his empire;"\* and that on "his affairs taking a favourable turn, he would, supported by the sentiments of the different branches of the Mahratta empire, be desirous of annulling the engagements he had made with the British government." Fourteen years had now passed since the conclusion of the first subsidiary alliance with the Peshwa at Bassein, and ten since the connexion was matured by the arrangements consequent on the successful issue of the first Mahratta war. If, during this period, Bajee Rao had maintained the character of a good ally, it was because the interval was necessary—first, to consolidate his own power, and then to court the general sentiment of the Mahratta nation, which had been so prophetically designated as the foundation of a future rupture. He was just reaching this elevation when Lord Hastings assumed the government; and the prominent part he thenceforward

\* Vide Pol. Despatch to the Court of Directors, September 1804.

acted in the political drama, affords the best development of his policy and actual disposition at the time.

At the courts of the three remaining powers with whom subsidiary alliances had been formed, the ascendancy of the British influence was fixed even more firmly than at Hyderabad. The territory and resources were, it is to be observed, in each case, much less considerable, whence the conviction felt of the greatness of our power, and of the utter hopelessness of any attempt to thwart our views caused them all to give at once into the policy of sparing no effort to secure our favour, on which rested all their hopes of prosperity. With the Gykwar, the same cause which operated at Hyderabad, viz. the prince's imbecility, had contributed to establish a state\* of things in some respects similar; but here the right of the British government to interfere in the internal administration of the country, was matter of express stipulation by treaty. The Mysore

\* Soon after the subsidiary alliance, the utter incapacity of Anund Rao, the reigning Gykwar, and the confusion introduced into his affairs by Arab mercenaries and bankers, to whom the state was indebted, induced the leading men to solicit the Bombay government to take on itself the Bhundaree, or guarantee of the public debt, and to give us support to Seeta Ram, son of Ranojee Apajce, as Dewan or prime minister, with full powers. This arrangement failing to re-

Raja was the same Kishenraj Oodiaver; who, on the fall of Seringapatam, was placed on the Guddee as an infant, by Lord Wellesley. Poornea, his famous minister, died in 1810; and the young Raja was now just beginning to take an interest in public affairs. His disposition gave early promise of an habitual reliance on the British government; and the circumstances of his elevation were a sufficient guarantee of the sincerity of his attachment. The Travankoor Raja was in 1814 an infant, recently born to one of the sisters of the prince who abetted the attack on Colonel Macaulay in 1808, and who died after the subjugation of his country in 1810. The state has not, since then, been entitled to much consideration in the scale of native powers; and for some time the country was governed, in the name of the regent Toombratee,\* by Colonel John Munro, who succeeded Colonel Macaulay as resident, and on whom the office of premier,

trieve the affairs of the state, from Secta Ram's want of ability, he was deprived of power, and the administration placed in the hands of a commission, whereof the British resident was a member. Subsequently Anund Rao's brother, Futeh Singh Gykwar, was vested with the sole direction of affairs under the resident's advice; and this was the state of things at Baroda on Lord Hastings' arrival.

\* The royal family of Travankoor are Nairs, amongst whom the sister's son has the prior claim to the inheritance. Toombratee is the title of the royal sisterhood.

with the title of Dewan, was conferred by the regent.

The disposition of the second class, viz. of Protected States, varied even more than that of the subsidizing powers; which was owing, perhaps, to their being left more to themselves, as few were of sufficient importance to require a political agent, whose sole business it should be to watch over their actions and influence their conduct.

The Raja of Bhurtpoor's object in accepting protection, in 1805-6, was to recover, without other equivalent than the nominal sacrifice of unrestrained latitude of political action, the fortress of Deeg and the greater part of his territory, then in our hands. The successful defence of his capital against the army of Lord Lake had raised this chief to a dangerous pre-eminence; and in all his subsequent dealings with the British he displayed the most arrogant haughtiness, not exempt from suspicion, distrust, and fear. Feeling that he had become a rallying point of disaffection, he seemed rather to court than avoid the character, and took the attitude of one ready again to try his fortune against us. But while he openly thwarted and irritated us to the full extent of our forbearance, he betrayed his real apprehensions, by conceding immediately when he found he could safely risk no further provocation.

The other protected chiefs on the same frontier,

of the scheme of these extensive relations always contemplated that, for a long time, several of the confederates would prove disaffected, many lukewarm, and few zealous for the maintenance of the system of general regulation introduced. The greatest forbearance towards all these different sentiments, and extreme moderation and consistency in our dealings, were essential to the successful management of the stupendous machine thus organized, particularly when a further eventual extension of the system was not an impossible contingency.

The states and powers of the third class, that is to say, those not directly under our influence, and with whom our connexion was that of mutual amity alone, were the Seikh chieftain Runjeet Singh, the Goorkha nation which ruled Nipâl, and the three Mahratta governments of Central India, namely, the Sindheca, Bhoosla, and Holkur families. We shall for the present confine the review to the Mahratta courts, and exclude the two first mentioned powers as not immediately connected with the purpose in hand. British residents were established at the head-quarters of the Sindheca and Bhoosla families, but none had ever been stationed at the Holkur durbar. Indeed, since the derangement of Juswunt Rao's intellect, and more especially since his death, which occurred in 1811, the power which had been reared and main-

tained by his personal ability, was fast falling to decay ; while Amcer Khan, Mohummed Shah Khan, and others of the retainers of this family, were raising themselves to consequence and independence on the ruins of its fortune. Juswunt Rao's son and successor, Mulhar Rao, was a minor ; and the intrigues of the women and their adherents, superadded to the frequent mutiny of the troops for pay, and the gradual desertion of the different commanders to seek their fortune in a life of predatory adventure, were the only occurrences to be found in the reports of the news-writers\* stationed at this court.

Sindhia, since the peace concluded with him in 1805, had steadily pursued the object of breaking the force and reducing the garrisons of the chiefs between the Chumbul and the Nerbudda, so as to establish and consolidate his own power in that quarter. A person little conversant in the affairs of India, and observing on the map the uniform colouring of a given space, described as forming the dominions of a Mahratta chief, would

\* The news-writer is a recognised functionary of Indian diplomacy, and though possessing no representative character, is respected and made frequently a channel of intercourse by the native princes, when there is no vakeel resident at the court. Almost all the communications with Runjeet Singh were made through the news-writer, a channel this chief preferred to the more formal mode of representation by letter.



he led to suppose, that his authority was peaceably established over the whole of that space, in like manner as the British authority is established within the districts marked as its immediate possessions. This, however, is quite inconsistent with the character of Mahratta conquest. Instead of commencing with the removal of the existing government, and the general assumption of the whole authority to himself, a Mahratta chieftain begins, by appearing at the season of harvest, and demanding a consideration for his forbearance in withholding the mischief he has it in his power to inflict. The visit is annually repeated, and the demand proportionally enhanced. Whatever is thus exacted is called the *Chout*, and the process of exaction a *Moolkgceeree* (country-taking) expedition. When the same chieftain has been in the habit of continuing his annual exactions from a certain district for a number of successive years, he considers the practice of making them a matter of right and property, and resents the interference of a stranger as an invasion of his possessions. In process of time, perhaps, he has a cantonment, or reduces a fort and establishes himself in the neighbourhood; his exactions swell to the full amount of the revenue; and, in the end, the authorities that may heretofore have retained the local administration by paying these exactions, will either be superseded and reduced to mere

cyphers, or be subdued and expelled by open force. The interval between the occurrence of this last act, and submission to the first exaction, will have been short or long, according as the opportunity may have been favourable for encroachment ; or as the party, upon whom it has been attempted, happened to possess the sagacity to perceive, and the means to resist, the obvious tendency of such a system.

At the epoch of the settlement with Sindheea and Holkur in 1805, when the British government engaged not to interfere with the dependencies of those chieftains lying within certain limits ; that is to say, in Malwa, Mewar, and Marwar (including Kota, Joudhpoor, and Oodeepoor) ; the dominions of both families exhibited every variety of the intermediate state above described. The towns and villages, of which they had complete occupation, were comparatively few, and were moreover scattered about in different directions, disconnected and intermingled one with another : except in these few, the army of either chief was the whole machinery of his government, and was at all times kept in motion for the purpose of enforcing contributions from reluctant tributaries, who regularly resisted, and often successfully. Under these circumstances, the effect of the peace concluded with the British was, merely to restrict the theatre of such warfare to their own assumed

dominions, and to allow the employment of the whole military power of each with greater activity against his respective dependents and nominal subjects. Thus, the confusion in that quarter of India, to which their operations were thenceforth confined, was necessarily increased, rather than diminished, by the peace; and one cannot wonder at the rapid rise of predatory hordes to power and consequence, under favour of such a state of affairs. Lord Wellesley's plan for the suppression of this system was, to extend his subsidiary alliances, which he expected would have the effect of inducing the native princes to discard their military establishments, as an useless expenditure and needless incumbrance. This plan was, however, abandoned by Sir George Barlow, so far as Sindheea and Holkur were concerned; indeed, their governments were so essentially military, that it could scarcely have succeeded with them under any circumstances, unless, in progress of time, they should assume a more regular form.

In 1805, and for some years after, Dowlut Rao Sindheea apparently took but little personal interest in the administration of his affairs. Until 1809, his government was, indeed, one of continual shifts and momentary expedients; and his durbar a mere arena for the factions of a selfish aristocracy, whereon to bring to issue their struggles for wealth and pre-eminence. The natural

death of Ambajee Inglia, the too powerful Sooba of Gwalior, and the violent one of Surjee Ráo, the father-in-law of Sindheea, both which occurred in 1809, enabled this prince to introduce a ministry more dependent on himself. Since that year, the control of affairs had been in the hands of a banker of the name of Gokul-paruk, recommended to office by his financial ability, and held in check by the counteracting influence and rivalry of personal favourites. By skilfully managing this balance, Dowlut Ráo had asserted and exercised a more direct personal control over the affairs of his principality, during the latter period.

Up to 1810, Sindheea generally was in motion the whole of the favourable season, with the greater part of his army, employed either in punishing his own refractory officers, or in *Moolkgeeree* expeditions in Malwa, Bhopál, or Rajpootana. Oojein was his nominal capital; but, after the forcible resumption of the Soobadaree of Gwalior from the family of his deceased vassal Ambajee, he pitched his camp a short distance to the south-west of that city and fortress; and as his court has never been moved from the spot, except for occasional pilgrimages, a second city has arisen on the site of his encampment, rivalling the old one in population at least, if not in the appearance and structure of its edifices.

The great body of his troops continued to be

distributed over the surface of the country, enforcing tribute in the usual way, and taking every opportunity, by the capture of fortresses, and the seizure or expulsion of the petty Rajas and chieftains in actual possession, to consolidate his power, and acquire a firmer hold of what had hitherto been more nominally than really under his dominion. The principal and most efficient of Sindheea's commanders employed on this service was Colonel Jean Baptiste Filoze, a man of ambiguous parentage ~~on the father's side~~, his mother having been a common woman of a camp bazar attached to one of the French battalions. He had, however, been brought up, if not acknowledged, by the French officer whose name he bears; and the wreck of the infantry trained by the officers of that nation was placed under his command, on their desertion in the course of the war. A considerable portion of Sindheea's artillery was also attached to this force: and, in the interval between the settlement of 1805 and Lord Hastings' arrival as Governor-General, the forts and territories of Bahadur-gurh, Gurra-kota, Chanderee, Shecopoor, with several others, had been wrested from their petty feudal lords by this commander. There were three other divisions of Sindheea's troops employed in the same manner, and commanded respectively by Bapoo Sindheea, Jiswunt Râo, Bhão (successor to Juggoo Bapoo deceased), and

Ambajee Punt. A fifth corps was stationed about his person at Gwalior, under command of one Jacob, a Portuguese half-cast, Arratoon, an Armenian, and some other officers. The strength of each of these corps was from seven or eight to ten thousand men of all arms; but it fluctuated according to the personal views and interests of the respective commanders; who were individually answerable to their troops for pay,—the greater part of Sindheea's territories being parcelled out amongst them, and assigned in lots for the subsistence of the several divisions, by the discretionary levy of exactions and contributions by each within the specified limits. Under such a system, the Gwalior Durbar could not be expected to exercise a very active control over any of the chiefs so employed; indeed, the intercourse of each with the court was an uniform series of mutual deception and jealousy.

The disposition of the prince towards the British government must, on the whole, be considered to have been rather favourable than otherwise. He found us punctual paymasters of the annual stipend of seven lack of rupees, agreed in November 1805 to be paid to him and his chiefs, in lieu of the Jageers they held in Hindoostan. Nor had we, on any one occasion, interfered with the prosecution of his system of exaction upon the petty feudatories within the circle of his influence. Even

when he sometimes trespassed beyond those limits, which, by the treaty of 1805, the British nation had engaged to consider as his legitimate prey, we had uniformly manifested the same indifference; and, though free to have checked his aggressions, and to have secured the advantage for ourselves, we had never, except perhaps in the instance of the Bundeela chiefs, whom we received under protection, stepped forward to thwart his views. Thus he had felt, that so long as he abstained from the territories of our actual allies, he might fearlessly pursue his own schemes in any direction; and as there was still abundant scope for his ambition, as well as of employment for his military dependents, within the limits from which we had withdrawn, he had scarcely been sensible of any restraint from our neighbourhood and superior power. This disposition resulted from his experience of our past conduct; but as he could have no security for our continuing to act on the same system, and as events seemed fast verging to that state which must force on us the adoption of one that could not but interfere with his plans and interests, it was natural that he should entertain a jealousy of our views, proportionate to the sense of his own comparative inferiority.

The disposition of Holkur's court was similar in this respect; and its Sirdars seemed to consider it their policy to avoid giving offence to the British

government, even when they affected personal independence.

The resources of Ragoojee Bhoosla had been so reduced by the effects of the war of 1803, which deprived him at once of Berar and Cuttack (Kutuk), that he was scarcely strong enough to defend his own dominions from the aggression of the predatory bands, which had collected along the Nerbudda. The military establishments of this prince, with the exception of some corps of Arabs kept near the Raja's person, were undoubtedly more defective than those of any native potentate. While fewer European improvements had been grafted on the old Mahratta system, the latter had lost all those qualities that ever had made it formidable. Indeed, so despicable was the character of his troops, that, in 1809-10, Ameer Khan, a Patan officer in Holkar's service, and one of those who was aspiring at independence, planned an attack on Nâgpoor in combination with the Pindarees, and would assuredly have annihilated the power of Ragoojee, had not the British gratuitously aided him in this extremity. A simultaneous movement from Hindoostan and the Dukhun induced Ameer Khan to abandon the design.\*

\* It was on this occasion, that a Madras and a Bengal force first met on the north of the Nerbudda; Colonel Sir Barry Close having advanced to Seronj, one of Ameer Khan's principal possessions, where he met Colonel Martindell from Bundelkhund



But Ragoojee's disposition towards us was far from friendly, notwithstanding the service thus rendered him : his resentment for the loss of Berar and Cuttack overpowered any feeling of gratitude for subsequent benefits. Yet fear dictated to him the necessity of keeping on the best terms with the British government : for the idea of his ability to call in its aid, was his main security, at this time, against the ambitious designs of the adventurers in his neighbourhood. Under this conviction, he was nevertheless jealous in the extreme of his political independence, and very averse to the formation of a specific defensive alliance of the same nature as those subsisting with the Nizam and Pêshwa ; conceiving it a sacrifice of his dignity and reputation among the states of India, to assume the character of dependence on a British subsidiary force.

Such being the feeling and disposition of the several Mahratta powers, there seemed little in their condition or motions calculated to excite any present alarm. As far as they were individually concerned, the object of the settlement of 1805-6 appeared to have been attained ; their weakness afforded a security against any one of them meditating a separate hostile enterprise ; at the same time, that the balance then established remained unaltered, and the mutual jealousies relied upon as the guarantee against a second

coalition were yet unextinguished. Nevertheless, there was an unsoundness in this system of our relations, which had been predicted by many, at the moment of their establishment on this basis. Its defects had begun to be apparent some time before 1814, and it could no longer be disguised, that the settlement of 1805 was, after all, but an incomplete arrangement, which must ere long be entirely remodelled. It had become manifest that this settlement, or rather the state resulting from it, instead of having a tendency to wean the population of India from habits of military adventure, in which so large a portion of it had theretofore been bred, rather multiplied the inducements to engage in that course of life. The class addicted to such habits was evidently fast increasing. At the time of the settlement, though there were certainly some bands of marauders and brigands associated under different leaders for purposes of general depredation, their number was not sufficient to attract notice; and it was thought that they must soon either be dissolved through want of effectual bonds of union, or be incorporated with the troops of the regular powers, or at any rate, that these latter, as soon as they were relieved from foreign wars and expeditions, would have the means, and see the advantage, of restraining bodies of men, who professedly subsisted on the plunder of their neighbours. Instead

of this result, however, either from weakness and indifference, or from some erroneous notion of the policy of favouring the lodgment, in their neighbourhood, of a military force, available as an addition to their own strength in the hour of need, without the charge of any regular pay or establishment, Sindheca and Holkur, if not active abettors of the growth of these freebooters, were, at least, very lukewarm in their efforts for their suppression. Their only solicitude was directed towards preventing aggression on themselves, and establishing a sort of nominal authority over as large a portion of the class as could be induced to acknowledge their supremacy. They even made liberal assignments of land to effect this object; and if a leader of a *durra* of Pindarees, so the associations were called, happened to make himself obnoxious, his ruin was attempted by turning against him the arms of a rival leader; without reflecting that such a policy must, in its consequences, rather perpetuate than suppress the evil: the ruin of one chief serving but to consolidate the equally dangerous power of another. It is by no means improbable, that the Mahratta states viewed the increase of the Pindarees with an eye to eventual service from their arms; for they avowedly attributed the disasters of the operations of 1803 to their having imitated the European mode of warfare, and affected to believe,

that, had they adhered to the Parthian method of their ancestors, the results of the contest would have been very different. The predatory hordes still pursued the old method; and the wonderful impunity and success with which they engaged in the most distant expeditions, passing the most formidable barriers of nature and of military art, and baffling every attempt to intercept their return, howsoever well concerted, gave a colour of probability to this opinion; indeed, their calculation was erroneous in one particular only, viz. that there were no strong-holds in India which could hope to baffle our military skill, in case we should adopt the plan of pursuing the depredators to their haunts. They were ignorant of the degree in which our means were superior to those of Aurung-Zeeb; and recollecting that he, after having driven them into their fastnesses, could effect no more, readily gave into the belief, that the British power, now in its zenith, was only to be combated by the arms and arts with which Sevajee had foiled the Moghul in times of yore.

It is immaterial, however, whether accident or design had permitted the predatory hordes to gain the strength they had attained in 1814. Their actual condition at that period entitled them to be regarded as a distinct political interest of the day, requiring an equal exertion of vigilance and circumspection, as Hyder in

the height of his power and inveterate animosity. The actual military force at the disposal of these associations amounted to 40,000 horse, inclusive of the Patans; who, though more orderly and better disciplined than the Pindarees of the Nerbudda, possessed the same character, and were similarly circumstanced in every respect, supporting themselves entirely by depredation wherever they could practise it. This number would be doubled, were we to add the remainder of Holkur's troops of the irregular kind, which were daily deserting the service of a falling house, in order to engage in the more profitable career of predatory enterprise; and the loose cavalry establishments of Sindheea and the Bhoosla, which were bound by no ties, but those of present entertainment, and were always in great arrear of pay. These materials formed the groundwork of an interest formidable at least to our repose, if not to our safety: and its central situation in India, nearly equi-distant from the dominions of the three presidencies, imposed the necessity of the most extensive annual precautions of defence, in spite of which the territories of our allies were continually overrun. On two occasions, once when they entered Guzerat in 1808-9, and again in 1812, when the Bengal provinces of Mirzapoor and Shahabad were devastated, they penetrated into our immediate territories, which for years before

had been exempt from such a calamity. The spirit of enterprise evinced on these occasions had much advanced the reputation of these associations; and although they were not now united under any single head, there had grown up among them a principle of concert in prosecution of common objects, such as a man of superior energy and abilities, had such an one chanced to arise among them, might model into the same description of force that Tynmoor and Chungeez Khan had directed to the devastation of the eastern world. The rise of Sevajee and of Hyder, both rapid and both formidable, was a proof that such things could take place in India as well as in other countries; and the whole of the unsettled spirits of Central India were exactly in the condition to engender such another conqueror. They resembled the bands of Companions that swarmed all over Europe in the fourteenth century; and wanted but a leader, whose standard they could rally round with confidence. The lawless and independent character of the Pindarees, and the mode of their association, which rendered the chiefs responsible to nobody for their acts, and made it impossible to hold any of the regular powers legitimately answerable for their dangerous existence, were the circumstances that made it necessary to watch their motions with especial caution, in order to anticipate the effects of any

sudden combination. With this view, the British power had interposed at once, when Ameer Khan had attempted to collect a large body together, in prosecution of his design upon the dominions of the Bhoosla Raja; it being our uniform and avowed object, to preserve things on their actual footing, and to prevent any of those fluctuations of power, which generally end in erecting a vigorous and ambitious domination on the ruins of a weak superannuated government. It was evidently not for our interest that either the Pindarees or the Patans should build up such an edifice on the site of any of the regular states with which we were at that time connected; and it was certainly incumbent on our policy to make some effort to prevent it.

A short sketch of the origin of the predatory hordes, passing under the general denomination of Pindarees, and of the chiefs under whom their numbers were arrayed in 1814, will lead to a more distinct view of their actual condition at that time. The name of Pindara is coeval with the earliest invasions of Hindoostan by the Mah-rattas; but the actual derivation of the word is unknown, notwithstanding the researches of several etymologists. The designation was applied to a sort of roving cavalry, that accompanied the Pêshwa's armies in their expeditions, rendering them much the same service as the Cos-

sacks \* perform for the armies of Russia. When the Pêshwas ceased to interfere personally in the affairs of Hindoostan, leaving that part of the Mahratta empire to the Sindheea and the Holkur chieftains, the Pindarees were thenceforth ranged in two parties, assuming respectively the appellation of Sindheea-shaheer, or of Holkur-shaheer, accordingly as they attached themselves to the fortunes of either family. They still preserved, however, all the peculiarities of their own mode of association; and the several leaders went over with their hands to one chief or the other, as best suited their private interests, or those of their followers. In 1794, the principal leaders first obtained assignments of land from Sindheea, in the valley of the Nerbudda, and amongst the hills which skirt it on the north. From that time till about 1800, there were two principal chiefs, the brothers Hecroo and Burun, whose standards were annually raised in that valley at the season of the Dusserra, (an annual festival that takes place at the end of October or the beginning of November,) as a rallying point for all loose spirits and unemployed military adventurers. Here they consulted upon the best means of providing for the necessities of the year, by the exercise of

\* Pindara seems to have the same reference to Pandour that Kuzâk, قزاق has to Cossack. The latter word is of Turkish origin, but is commonly used to express a mounted robber in Hindoostan.



rapine, accompanied by every enormity of fire and sword, upon the peaceful subjects of the regular governments. † Until the close of the rains and the fall of the rivers, their horses were carefully trained, to prepare them for long marches and hard work. The rivers generally became fordable by the close of the Dussera. The horses were then shod, and a leader of tried courage and conduct having been chosen as Luhbureea, all that were so inclined set forth on a foray or luhbur, as it was called in the Pindaree nomenclature. These parties latterly consisted sometimes of several thousands. All were mounted, though not equally well; out of a thousand, the proportion of good cavalry might be 400: the favourite weapon was a bamboo spear, from twelve to eighteen feet long; but, as fire-arms were sometimes indispensable for the attack of villages, it was a rule that every fifteenth or twentieth man of the fighting Pindarees should be armed with a matchlock. Of the remaining 600, 400 were usually common *lootcees*, indifferently mounted, and armed with every variety of weapon; and the rest slaves, attendants, and camp followers, mounted on tattoos or wild ponies, and keeping up with the *luhbur* in the best manner they could. It is not surprising that a body so constituted, and moving without camp-equipage of any kind, should traverse the

whole of India in defiance of the most active pursuit by regular troops along the same line of march: indeed, the rapidity with which they spread their devastations to the southern extremity of the Peshwa's and of the Nizam's territories, over an extent of not less than seven degrees of latitude from the Nerbudda, baffled every attempt to interrupt or overtake them. *The cruelties they perpetrated were beyond belief.* As it was impossible for them to remain more than a few hours on the same spot, the utmost despatch was necessary in rifling any towns or villages into which they could force an entrance; every one whose appearance indicated the probability of his possessing money, was immediately put to the most horrid torture \*, till he either pointed out his hoard, or died under the infliction. Nothing was safe from the pursuit of Pindaree lust or avarice; it was their common practice to burn and destroy what could not be carried away; and, in the wantonness of barbarity,

\* A favourite mode of compulsion with them was, to put hot ashes into a bag, which they tied over the mouth and nostrils of their victim, whom they then thumped on the back till he inhaled the ashes. The effect on the lungs of the sufferer was such, that few long survived the operation. Another common mode was, to throw the victim on his back, and place a plank or beam across his chest, on which two people pressed with their whole weight.

to ravish and murder women and children, under the eyes of their husbands and parents.

In the infancy of the establishment of the Pindarees on the banks of the Nerbudda, their devastations were not carried to so great a distance as afterwards, when they began to feel their strength, and when the desolation of the immediate neighbourhood, or its submission to the levy of contributions on the condition of exemption, made it requisite to push their expeditions to a distance, in order to make them sufficiently productive. With the fruits of these expeditions, the chiefs were, from the first, enabled to keep together a large military force without much territorial revenue; and to offer the occasional services of a part of their strength to Sindhceea, Holkur, and other neighbouring chieftains, at a cheaper rate than the same amount of assistance was elsewhere procurable. By means of further assignments obtained in recompense for such services, and of conquests made by the bands thus kept together upon the Grassea (aboriginal) Rajas, in the mountains bordering the Nerbudda, who had never yet submitted to the Mahrattas, the Pindaree chiefs gradually extended their influence; while, at the same time, the reputation of these successes brought additional swarms of adventurers to their standard. ✓

About the year 1800, the two chiefs Heeroo

and Burun died, either in the course of nature, or by violent means, the one at Nâgpoor, and the other at Asceergurh. Both left sons; the former, Dost Mohummed and Wâsil Mohunmed; the latter, the two Rajuns; but it was not till after some time that these individuals succeeded to any part of their fathers' influence: the pre-eminence devolved, in the first instance, upon other *Sirdars*, according to their reputation and ability as leaders. Kureem Khan, a *Holkur-shahce Pindara*, was the first who rose to consequence after the death of the brothers; indeed, he was not altogether free from suspicion of having procured the death of Burun at Asceergurh. Kureem was an active, bold, and ambitious adventurer, sufficiently devoid of principle to profit by the politics of the time. He commenced his career by joining the rising fortunes of Jeswunt Rao *Holkur*, with a considerable party of followers, pledged to consider their own and their leader's interest as inseparable. His services proved valuable to *Holkur*, and were suitably rewarded. A short time after, he was bought over by *Sindheca*, who gave him the title of *Nuwab*, and several assignments of land in the valley, and above the *ghâts* of the *Nerbudda*: thenceforth he called himself a *Sindheca-shahce Pindara*, though he was frequently found in arms against the adherents of his nominal superior. He enlarged his

possessions by interfering in the internal affairs of Bhopál, and in the contests of this state with the Bhoosla. After worsting the latter, he excited a civil war in Bhopál; and giving his support to one party, was very near establishing his authority over the whole principality; but the state was saved by the personal courage and conduct of Wuzzeer Mohummed, with the assistance of Dost Mohummed, the son of Heeroo, who began about that time to rise into notice as a rival of Kureem. During the prosecution of this ambitious course of self-aggrandisement, there was never any intermission of the systematic predatory expeditions, that still formed one of the main resources by which the chieftains maintained their military power. Sindheea himself, the Bhoosla Raja, and the Hindoo chiefs of Bundelkhund, were the principal sufferers by their depredations at this period \*.

During the troubles of the Mahratta empire consequent upon the war with the British, Kureem Khan availed himself of the opportunity to seize on some possessions of Sindheea and of the Peshwa's jagcerdars in Malwa; insomuch, that after

\* The tolerance of this practice may, in part, be accounted for by the recollection, that a predatory inroad is not considered derogatory to the dignity of a Mahratta government, which avowedly regards rapine as a legitimate resource of the state.

the conclusion of hostilities in the year 1806, he was in the occupation of a territory of not less than eleven pergunnas, whereof the principal were Baireea, Ashta, Shujawulpoor, Sarungpoor, Ichawur, and Sehoree, above the ghâts of the Nerbud-da, together with Sutwas, Chipaneer, and other places within the valley. His annual Land-revenue from this territory exceeded fifteen lack of rupces, besides compensations for immunity from plunder, which he levied on most of the neighbouring rajas and chiefs. He had also built himself a fort in the part of his territory acquired from Bhopâl, which was called, after him, Kureemgarh. His power was now at the height; for though there were several Pindaree leaders who had never joined his standard, and who even affected a rivalry for the supremacy he had arrogated; still there were none whose means or influence at all approximated to those of Kureem. Though himself independent in every respect, and even an usurper upon Sindheea on more occasions than one, he still affected to be attached to that chief's interest, and to call himself a Sindheea-shahce Pindara, for the obvious purpose of retaining some claim to protection in case of exigency. His power, however, excited that prince's jealousy; and in 1806, very soon after the settlement with the English, Sindheea, by the proffer of his aid in the reduction of a fort (that, for want of artillery,

had long baffled the attacks of Kureem), inveigled the Pindara to an interview, at which he seized his person, making a simultaneous attack on his camp, which was completely plundered.\* Kureem's possessions were then quickly recovered; and, for five years, he was himself detained a close prisoner in the dungeons of Gwalior. His durra, in the mean time, was not broken up, though reduced to no more than two or three thousand horse, by the defection of the greater part of the sirdars of inferior note; who had been tempted, in the full tide of his success, to unite their interest with his. The fall of this chief, however, strengthened the durras of other leaders, particularly of Chectoo or Sectoo, a chief under whom the two Rajuns, sons of Burun, held a subordinate rank, and who had always been the avowed rival of Kureem, though hitherto the power of the latter had greatly preponderated. The party of Dost' Mohummed also acquired a great accession of strength by the ruin of Kureem, whose durra had now little else than plunder to subsist upon. The search of this, however, it prosecuted with considerable success under Kureem's deputies, and especially one Namdar Khan; who made Sindheea's territories the principal theatre of his depredations, in revenge for the trea-

\* For an account of this, vide Broughton's *Mahratta Camp*. This officer was present, and witnessed the whole scene.

chery employed against his leader. In 1811, Kureem purchased his release from Sindheea for six lack of rupees, which were punctually paid through Zalim Singh of Kota. Returning to the scene of his former power, he immediately raised fresh levies of infantry, and invited the Pindaree chiefs, who had before followed his fortunes, to rally again round his standard. In a very short time he recovered the greater part of the territory he had formerly possessed, and laid his plans to effect a general combination of all the Pindarees, preparatory to an expedition of more than ordinary moment. Even his rival Cheetoo was induced to unite with his durra; and the Dussera of 1811 was celebrated by an assemblage of not less than 25,000 cavalry of all descriptions, besides several battalions of infantry newly raised for the purpose. Kureem proposed to lead this force immediately against Nâgpoor, the weakness of which was notorious to all the Pindarees, whose detached parties had, a short time before, succeeded in carrying off a considerable booty from a suburb of the city itself. The Bhoosla state had fortunately won over Cheetoo by the recent grant of considerable jageers on the Nerbudda. He accordingly opposed the project, and retired with his durra in discontent.

This division proved the ruin of Kureem; for having a second time awakened Sindheea's jea-



lousy, Juggoo Bapoo, one of Sindheea's principal officers, was sent against him with as large a force as could be collected, and with a reinforcement of some battalions of Holkur. There is reason to believe that this enterprise was invited by Cheetoo, who feared the consequences of having thwarted the designs of Kureem in respect to Nágpoor; at all events, he was the main instrument of its success, and the person who derived the greatest advantages; the major part of his late rival's possessions being allotted by Sindheea as his share of the spoil. Kureem, expecting from Cheetoo at least neutrality and indifference to his fate, advanced boldly to encounter Juggoo Bapoo. His rival, however, took an active part against him, so that he was completely defeated near Munolur-Thana, and obliged to fly, with a few adherents, and seek refuge in the camp of Ameer Khan, beyond the Chumbul. The strong representations of Sindheea and Holkur obliged the Patan chief to place him in a kind of restraint, in which he remained until the end of 1816. His durra again declined to a secondary condition in comparison with that of Cheetoo, at whose cantonment of Nemawur, on the Nerbudda, not less than 15,000 horse now annually assembled at the Dussera festival, to issue forth under a leader of his nomination, in whatever direction he might prescribe.

*In 1814, the following was supposed to be the*

relative strength of the Pindaree durras: Cheetoo 5000 good horse; total of all descriptions about 10,000, exclusive of the Holkur-shahee Pindarees, mustering from 4 to 5000 more, who latterly attached themselves chiefly to his standard. The remains of Kureem's durra amounted to 2000 good horse; total of every description, at least 4000. Under Dost Mohammed 6000, with the usual proportion of the best quality; this chief held considerable jageers above the ghâts of the Nerbudda, and usually cantoned in the Bhopâl territory. There were, moreover, at least 6 or 8000 horse under independent leaders of inferior note, who joined one or other of the superior chiefs, as occasion suited. The party that penetrated into the district of Mirzapoor through Rewa was of the durra of Dost Mohammed, who planned the expedition a short time before the second fall of Kureem. It was led by Fazil Khan; and, turning east as soon as it reached the Mirzapoor frontier, advanced to the neighbourhood of Gya, and then disappeared up the course of the Soane, on its way back to Malwa by the Chandya Ghât, before a single soldier from any British cantonment could come up with its track. Such was the anomalous and undefinable power that had grown up into consequence out of the political arrangements of 1805-6. Its leading feature was hostility to all regular governments, and of course most particu-

larly to ourselves and our allies, whose territories offered the richest booty. The existence of these hordes imposed the necessity of constant vigilance along the whole extent of the south-west frontier of the Bengal presidency ; while, for the security of the Dukhun, the subsidiary forces of the Nizam and Pêshwa were annually obliged to move to the northern frontier of their respective territories ; notwithstanding which precautions, the dominions of those states were continually penetrated and overrun.

Ameer Khan and Mohunmed-shah Khan, the two Patan chiefs, who were rising into a similar and equally formidable pre-eminence, commanded forces of a very different description from those of the Pindaree chiefs, though actuated by the same predatory spirit : each of them, besides horse, had large bodies of infantry and several guns. Mohunmed-shah Khan's infantry were the old battalions of Tukojee Holkur, undoubtedly the best in India not under the actual command of European officers. Ameer Khan's were scarcely inferior. The cavalry were besides paid by the month, instead of living avowedly on plunder alone, like the Pindarees. Indeed, the grand difference between the two classes was, that the Patans were banded together for the purpose of preying on governments and powerful chiefs : to this end, their force moved about with the materials of re-

gular battles and sieges, so as to work on the fears of princes and men in power, extorting contributions and other advantages from them, by such intimidation as an efficient army only could impress. The object of the Pindarees, on the contrary, was general rapine; they preyed upon the population at large, without arrogating an ability to cope with the governments; their form and constitution, therefore, were framed with a view to this exclusive purpose. B149

Rajpootana was the principal field for the exhibition of the species of depredation practised by the Patan leaders. The nature of the principalities of that tract, each of which was a petty feudal government, at war with its neighbours and with its own vassals, seemed to mark it out as their destined prey. Nor was it a new game that they were playing in that quarter; they merely followed up what Sindheea and Holkur had long been habitually pursuing. Indeed, although the objects of the Patan chiefs were wholly personal, and prosecuted with perfect independence of each other, still they represented the Holkur interest in the country, and had introduced their forces under sanction of that name. The very means they possessed, viz. the artillery and regular battalions, had belonged to the Holkur family, though now employed in supporting and establishing an interest virtually distinct.

Notwithstanding this virtual independence of the Patans, Sindheea did not leave them in the undisputed enjoyment of the contributions and other advantages to be extorted from Rajpootana. A division of his army, under Bapoo Sindheea lay at Ajmeer, acting precisely on the principles of the Patans, and living on the plunder it could exact from Jypoor and Joudhpoor. Another force was stationed in the Oodeepoor territory, encroaching on the power and possessions of the Raja there, and devastating the country. The Rajpoots, however, were considerably more jealous of Sindheea's apparently consolidated power than of the Patan chiefs; whose very loose connexion with the Holkur family gave them the character of mercenaries, that, for objects of private interest, might be hired and discharged at pleasure. Thus in 1809, when Sindheea seemed to meditate an invasion of the Joudhpoor territory with a very considerable force, the Raja called in Mohummed-Shah Khan, and took his army into pay for the purpose of repelling the attack.

This facility of transferring their services according to their personal views, gave the Patan chiefs the further advantage over Sindheea and his commanders, of a pretext and power to interfere in the passing intrigues amongst the Rajpoots themselves, and to become partisans of the several actions, from each of which they took care to

reap some personal advantage. So long as they had the prospect of such recompense, they were not over scrupulous of the means of earning it. Ameer Khan twice sold his services for the treacherous assassination of obnoxious persons, and accomplished his purpose, on both occasions, at conferences held under the most solemn guarantees. This chief was the acknowledged head of the Patan interest. His views of ambition were, however, not confined to Rajpootana until 1814; when, finding from the activity of our preparations, whenever he seemed to be meditating an enterprize against the Bhoosla, that we were resolved to prevent his aggrandisement in that quarter, he moved from Malwa across the Chumbul towards Rajpootana; and having strengthened his interest at the durbar of Holkur (then held at Rampoorah-Bhanpoora), took upon himself the supreme management of the Patan forces and interests. Mohammed-Shah Khan, Jumsheed Khan, and the other sirdars, agreed to act in subordination to him. The former of these dying about the end of 1814, the troops he had commanded became incorporated with those under the personal command of Ameer Khan. This military adventurer was thus placed at the head of a force of at least 30,000 horse and foot, furnished with an artillery well manned and served: yet he had no claim to be recognised as a substantive power;

though, on the other hand, no one of the regular governments could fairly be held responsible for his acts. The field of his operations lay, it is to be observed, in a quarter where there was every likelihood of his coming ere long into contact with the British government, or with those under its protection.

Against this power, as well as the Pindarces, we were obliged to be continually armed, and on the alert. The want of any determinate territory or home, or of any other stake to be hazarded by the first act of hostility, left us entirely without security for their peaceable demeanour; there was nothing to restrain them but mere motives of convenience, and the sense that the calculation of the chances of success was against them. This, however, was the result of continual and most expensive preparation,—the necessity of which was a part of the evil that required a remedy.

Such was the state of Central India at the beginning of the year 1814. The events which led to the final catastrophe of the year 1817-18 will be traced through the intermediate period, with as much conciseness as may be found consistent with the object of exhibiting a distinct view of the origin of those occurrences, and the share which the conduct of the British government may have had in producing them.

Before, however, entering on this narrative, it will be necessary to detain the reader with an account of the origin and progress of the war forced upon us by the Goorkha government of Nipâl, with which negotiations had been some time pending when Lord Hastings arrived in India.



## CHAPTER II.

## CAUSES OF THE NIPĀL WAR.

Rise and Policy of the Goorkha Nation—Prithee Nurayun Sah—Run Buhadur—Account of the Turæe—Border disputes—Sarun frontier—Gourukpoor ditto—Bootwul case—Proceedings of Sir G. Barlow and Lord Minto—Further aggressions of the Nipālese—Occupation of 22 Villages of Sarun—Appointment of Commissioners—Result of investigation—Resolution of Government thereon—and of the Goorkha Court—Occupation of Bootwul by the British—Treacherous attack and murder of the Police-officers stationed there—*Conduct of the Nipālese on other parts of the frontier.*

THE state of Nipāl has purposely been reserved for separate mention, both because its situation and the circumstances which brought it into contact with the British government have no direct connexion with the states and powers of central India, and because the conduct of this nation, which made war inevitable, even before Lord Hastings had set foot in the country, requires more specific explanation than suited the cursory view of the condition of other powers taken in the preceding chapter.

It is foreign to our design to attempt any consistent relation of the means and gradations by which the Goorkhas had risen to power, in the mountainous tract stretching between the plains of Hindoostan and the high lands of Tartary and Tibet. Suffice it to say, that when Lord Hastings took charge of the supreme government, he found their dominion to extend as far as the river Teesta to the east, and westward to the Sutlej; so that this nation was then in actual possession of the whole of the strong country which skirts the northern frontier of Hindoostan.

This extent of dominion had been acquired entirely during the last fifty years, by the systematic prosecution of a policy likened by the Goorkhas themselves, and, not inaptly so, to that which had gained for us the empire of Hindoostan. The hill Rajas, whom they had successively conquered and displaced, were mere ignorant, selfish tyrants, on bad terms with their subjects and neighbours, but most of all, with their own relations. Thus, while there was amongst them no principle of combination for mutual defence against a common enemy, not one of the petty principalities was sufficiently strong or united within itself to be capable of substantial resistance.

The Goorkha chiefs were at all times as ready to apply the influence of intrigue as open force, and could well combine both for the pro-

ecution of their ends. They had a regular army, obedient to its officers, and the whole in proper subordination to the state. This was always available to the weaker party upon conditions, and the frequent internal dissensions of the Rajas, which successively came to form the Goorkha frontier, never failed to produce the invitation.

*Prithee Nurayun Sah* has the merit of establishing the system which raised this nation to power. Taught by the example of our early victories in Bengal, he armed and disciplined a body of troops after the English fashion; and after a struggle of more than ten years, finally subjugated the valley of Nipál by their means in 1768. The Moorshedabad Nuwab (Kasim Ulee Khan) attempted to interfere in 1762-3, but sustained a signal defeat under the walls of Mukwanpoor; and the British government was not more successful in an effort made some years after to succour the last of the Sooruj Bunsee dynasty, who reigned at Katmandoo.\*

\* The expedition was undertaken at the recommendation of Mr. Golding, the commercial agent at Betia, who feared that the success of the Goorkhas would ruin the trade he before carried on with Nipál: it had been interrupted for three or four years in consequence of the subjugation of Mukwanpoor. Major Kinloch commanded the party destined for the relief of the Nipál Raja. He was a good officer; but advanced into the hills a month at least too early (in October 1767), and had not

Prithee Nurayun dying in 1771, his son Singh Purtap, and, in 1775, his grandson Run Buhadur came successively to the throne; the latter, however, being an infant, Buhadur Sah, another son of Prithee Nurayun, struggled long with his brother's widow for the regency. Her death at last gave him the ascendancy, which he kept till 1795; when Run Buhadur came of age, and forcibly assumed the sceptre to the destruction of his uncle.

Run Buhadur, proving a tyrant, was expelled in 1800, and took refuge for a time at Bunarus. In the interval of his exile, the Bengal government established a commercial treaty with the ruling faction; and Captain Knox was sent resident to Katinandoo in 1802. Colonel Kirkpatrick had before been employed on a mission to that capital by Lord Cornwallis, but was obliged to return without effecting any thing; and the same jealousy of the object with which the connexion was sought by us being still alive,

*strength enough to establish a chain of depôts to secure his communication with the plains; consequently, having penetrated to Hureehurpoor, he was detained there by a nulla, not fordable, and the bridge and raft he constructed were carried away after a fall of rain, which swelled the torrent unnaturally. The delay thus experienced exhausted his supplies, and produced sickness; so that, finally, he was obliged to return early in December,—the time when, properly, he should have set out.*

Captain Knox was recalled, and the connexion broken off in 1804.

Run Buhadur left Bunarus, and was received again with open arms by his subjects of Katmandoo, soon after Captain Knox's recall; but his disposition proved to be incorrigibly tyrannical: his bad propensities had been exasperated rather than chastened by adversity, and by the restraints of a residence within the British frontier. The principal people of the court therefore, who found themselves the objects of a revengeful persecution, a second time formed a conspiracy against the Raja, which was brought to a desperate issue prematurely. The conspirators, having some reason to apprehend that they were betrayed, suddenly resolved to sell their lives as dearly as possible; and one of them, the Raja's half brother, rushed forward and cut Run Buhadur down nearly to the middle by a blow of his koka,\* as he sat in full darbar in 1805. A barbarous affray followed, in which the brother was himself slain with most of the chief men of the state, and the royal family was nearly extinguished. An infant son of Run Buhadur's was, however, with difficulty secreted in the women's apartments, and thus saved from the massacre by Bheem Sein-Thapa, who proclaimed him a few days after, by

\* The koka is a short but heavy sword, the edge of which is on the inner side, like that of a scythe.

the name of Kurman Jodh Bikrum Sah, and who, by his influence with the regent-mother, succeeded in introducing himself to a large share in the government. The Raja was still in his minority when the war broke out with the British; and the power of the state was in the hands of an aristocracy, composed of the highest military officers, with whom were associated some of the Raja's distant relations, and some Brahmins. The Panres, or Pandeas, were at the head of the faction which had expelled Run Buhadur, in 1800, but on that chief's return, they were for the most part cut off or expatriated; and since then the Thapas had acquired the paramount authority. Bheem Sein Thapa, who assumed and still uses the English title of General, had the principal conduct of affairs at the capital. He was the son of a chief named Kajee Umur Singh Thapa, governor of Palpa on the Gourukhpoor frontier, and who died in October 1814.

All the territory held by the Goorkhas west of the Gogra had been acquired within the last fifteen years, by the arms of another Umur Singh Thapa; who, having been for many years at the head of a successful army, had clothed himself with a power, which the nationality of his troops and his own patriotism alone prevented him from making independent. The terms on which he stood towards those who conducted affairs at Katmandoo,

and the politics of the court, generally, will be better understood from what we shall presently have to relate: we shall first state briefly the nature and origin of the disputes which ultimately brought on the war.

The whole range of hills is skirted along its southern base by a magnificent forest, chiefly of Sâl trees, (*Shorea robusta*). The timber is useful in ship-building, though far inferior to the teak of Malabar, and of the Burman empire. The boats, however, which navigate the upper Ganges, and the beams and rafters for building throughout Hindoostan, even down to Calcutta, are almost exclusively made of it. The forest therefore is valuable\*; it abounds in elephants, which are chiefly prized for their teeth, the animals being less fit for carriage, and in other respects greatly inferior to what are caught at Chittagong, Ceylon, and in the countries nearer the Line. Beyond the forest, towards Hindoostan, is an open plain, called the Turace or Terecana, which is chiefly valuable on account of the fine pasture it yields during the months of April and May, when the periodical hot winds entirely destroy the herbage of the more southern regions. The bunjaree bullocks from Malwa, and even from the northern parts of the

\* It is a saying of the Goorkhas, that every tree is a mine of gold.

Dukhun, come here to graze in those months ; and the Kahchuraee, or pasturage-rate, levied by the border Zemindars, is a very productive branch of their revenue.

The soil of the Turaee is for the most part extremely rich ; and though the number of wild elephants, rhinoceroses, and buffaloes that find shelter in the adjoining forest, makes it very uncertain whether the husbandman will reap the fruits of his tillage, cultivation has nevertheless made rapid advances there. The insalubrity of the climate during a great portion of the year, prevents the establishment of any considerable towns in the tract. The population is, indeed, for the most part migratory ; the several classes retiring either into the hills, or to a distance in the plains, when the unhealthy season commences. There are ruins, however, at Sumroun, and in other parts of the Turaee, which would seem to indicate that, at some former period, the capital of an extensive province was situated there, and that the tract therefore was not always so unhealthy as it is now deemed ; but nothing satisfactory on this head has yet been ascertained.

From time immemorial, the country within the hills and on the borders has been divided amongst petty Hindoo Rajas, and the forest and Turaee have naturally been a perpetual bone of contention to them ; a chieftain pos-



sessing fastnesses in the hills could always enforce contributions, by issuing thence and carrying off booty from those who hesitated to comply. Hence every hill Raja had a sweep of the forest and low country attached to his estate, and this he was continually endeavouring to extend, either by intrigue, or by violence, or by any means that presented. The superior wealth and greater number of followers at the command of some of the Rajas of the plains, enabled them occasionally to penetrate and reduce to subjection a hill neighbour; but *ordinarily, such enterprizes* were beyond their skill or resources; and the border-war was handed down from father to son, in their respective families.

Neither Ukbur nor any of his descendants on the throne of Dehlee made any attempt to add the tract of hills to the Moghul empire; its revenue was not an object of cupidity, nor was its population sufficiently formidable to make the subjugation of the country necessary as an act of political precaution. The Rajas of the plains, on the other hand, though compelled to submit to the Moosulman yoke, retained their territories, and became tributaries of the empire; which did not prevent their prosecuting their hereditary feuds with their neighbours in the hills, in the same manner as heretofore. The Moghul officers, not sorry to see a powerful vassal weakened, would

sometimes foment these disputes, and make grants of their tributary's lands in the plains, for the aggrandizement of a hill Raja ; whose name would thus be added to the list of subjects. Ordinarily, however, the Soobas did not interfere in the management of the affairs of this remote tract. The Rajas, therefore, were at perfect liberty to pursue their old system ; and such continued to be the state of this frontier, until the low countries fell under the British dominion, and the hills were gradually overrun by the Nipålese, and consolidated by them into one sovereignty.

The British government, assimilating its conduct to that of its predecessors, did not interfere with the possessions of the Rajas in the plains ; but contented itself with a money-tribute, or at least with a composition for the rights asserted by the Moghuls, which becoming fixed in amount at the perpetual settlement, may be so described.

The Goorkhas, on the other hand, as each Raja in the hills successively fell before them, exterminated the family ; and, becoming heir to all its possessions, took up likewise the old Raja's claims and contests with his neighbours. This brought them into contact with our Zemindars, who were, of course, unable to maintain themselves against such an enemy, and generally therefore had to resign the object in dispute ; for,

unless when the encroachment was gross and easy of proof, it was vain to hope to interest the British government in their favour. That government was, in the first place, no loser by the usurpation, for the public revenue was fully secured by the perpetual settlement, and by the increased value of the entire estate against any loss from a partial aggression. Moreover, it was, on principle, distrustful of the pretensions of its own subjects, which were generally exaggerated; while it regarded the Goorkha nation as a well-disposed neighbour, whom it was desirable to conciliate; hence an injured Raja of the plains would seldom succeed in procuring any powerful support to his cause, unless, as above observed, the case were very flagrant, when the Goorkhas would on remonstrance make reparation.

It will be proper to illustrate this view by an appeal to facts; and the disputes on the Sarun frontier, one of the main causes of the war, afford a case strongly in point.

The Raja of Chumparun, who resides at Bétia, was perpetually at war with the Raja of Mukwanpoor within the hills, for different portions of the Turæe; and amongst other sources of dispute, each of them had pretensions to sovereignty over part of a Perguna called Sunroun, the same in which the ruins before alluded to are situated. We shall endeavour to explain the circumstances

of this dispute with some minuteness, at the risk of appearing tedious.

The Mukwanpoor family granted Roteehut and Puchrouttee, two tuppas (sub-divisions) of the above Perguna, in Jageer to Ubdoollah Beg, a Moosulman, who had influence enough with the Moorshedabad family to get there a confirmation of the tenure by the Nazim. The Betia Raja, who had claims on the tract, and was, there is reason to believe, then in possession, at first resisted; but in the end, gave likewise to Ubdoollah a sunud\* for the same lands. Thus was the Moosulman's tenure secured, to whichever party the right belonged; but as the Mukwanpoor grant was the oldest in date, and had been acknowledged at Moorshedabad, this Raja's title to resume eventually acquired a kind of preference. In 1763, Prithce Nurayun, having subdued the Mukwanpoor Raja, claimed to be feudal superior over Ubdoollah; and resolved, as soon as he had secured his conquest, to resume the Jageer. Accordingly, after a year or two, he seized not only Ubdoollah's lands, but twenty-two villages more, which he claimed to be part of Roteehut, though not in the Jageerdar's possession.

Ubdoollah fled to the English authorities; who took up his cause, and made his injuries one pretext for the declaration of war issued prior to the

\* Sunud, a deed of gift.

advance of Major Kinloch in 1767. This officer, having failed in penetrating into the hills, was desired to occupy the whole Turæe, as a means of remunerating the British government for the expense incurred. Ubdollah then claimed his Jageer, and Roteehut and Puchrouttee were in consequence given up to him. When peace was restored with the Nipálese, they sent an agent named Deenanath to claim the territory given up to Ubdollah Beg as part of Mukwanpoor. This was opposed by the Betia Raja, and a long investigation ensued; when, upon the strength of the first deed of grant to Ubdollah, which was on copper, and of a date falling in 1743, Mr. Hastings finally decided, in 1781, that Roteehut and Puchrouttee belonged to Mukwanpoor, and were not parcel of Betia or Chumparun. While this contest was undetermined, the Goorkhas courted Ubdollah, and promised to maintain him, for without his help their title could not have been established. After it was decided, however, they resumed his Jageer, and occupied it for themselves. The twenty-two villages seized, on the first invasion of the Goorkhas, on pretence of their belonging to Roteehut, had never been given up either to Ubdollah, or to the Nipálese; and no demand was ever made for them. On the contrary, from the time of Major Kinloch's occupation, in January 1768, the revenue of them was uniformly collected as parcel of the Tappa of

Nunnor, or Noor: belonging equally with Roteehut to the Perguna of Sunroun, but falling in that portion of it which was annexed to Chumparun. At the perpetual settlement concluded by the British government in 1790, Nunnor formed part of the lands for which the Raja of Betta engaged: and thus the matter stood on this frontier till 1810: the twenty-two villages continuing all the while in this Raja's possession.

From the above statement it will be seen that Roteehut, which appears to have originally belonged to the Raja of the plains, was finally dismembered from his territory, and annexed to the hills, by the effect of the intrigue of the hill Raja with Ubdoolah Beg. It was even more common, however, for a hill Raja to become possessed of an estate by usurpation, and then to have his title acknowledged by being permitted to engage for the revenue. The offer of an advance in the yearly rate, or a present payment in cash, was always sufficient to effect such an arrangement with a temporary Amil: and after once procuring possession, with an acknowledged title, all future payments were of course dependent on circumstances, and the interest of the moment.

Of the confusion incident to this conduct in native Amils, more than one instance was brought to light upon our occupying the territory ceded by the Nuwab Vizeer in 1801. The most notable

was that of the Raja of the independent hill territory of Palpa, who had contrived to possess himself of Bootwul, lying for the most part in the plains; for the revenue of which he accounted to the Nuwab Vizeer's government. In like manner the Goorkhas themselves had usurped Sheeraj on the same frontier; and they further held two Talooks, called Tilpoor and Bunaceekpoor, by the same sufferance; professing to be accountable for the revenue, though they paid or not, according to circumstances.

The Bootwul case requires particular mention. On our first occupying Gourukpoor, the Raja of Palpa's family had been recently driven out of the further hills, and obliged to take refuge in Bootwul, which is situated in the mouth of the first pass. At the settlement of the district in 1801-2, the Raja's manager engaged to us, as he had heretofore done to the Oudh government, for the lands of Bootwul, at a juma, or annual assessment, of 32,000 rupees. The Raja himself was then at Katmandoo, negotiating about his territory in the hills. He came, however, to the plains shortly after, and confirmed the engagement with the British Collector, which had been entered into by his manager.

The Goorkhas subsequently induced him to return to Katmandoo, where he was committed to prison, and in the end put to death. The family

upon this, fearing the continued enmity of the Goorkhas if they resided on the frontier, obtained permission to give up Bootwul to the Company's Khas, or special management, and took up their residence at the station of Gourukpoor, upon a pension being assigned to them in lieu of their profit from the management of the estate.

The Goorkhas in 1804, on the ground of having subdued the Palpa Raja, claimed Bootwul as part of his territory. They immediately, therefore, began sending people to collect the rents, instead of allowing them to be received by the company's manager. By November 1805, they had established their influence over two-thirds of the Perguna; but the circumstance having been brought to Sir G. Barlow's notice, when he was at Allahabad in that year, he addressed a letter to the court at Katmandoo, calling upon them to evacuate Bootwul; and giving them to understand that the company's right to the sovereignty of Shecoraj also was undoubted,—the Talook being included by name amongst the Oudh cessions, and the Goorkhas having no title but that of usurpation. Since, however, the date of the seizure of this place was anterior to our possession of Gourukpoor, Sir George professed a willingness to give up his claim to Shecoraj, on the condition of the instant evacuation of Bootwul. The Goorkhas answered this by an offer to farm Bootwul as



a Zemindaree, on the terms agreed to by the Raja and his manager at the first settlement: this, however, was refused, and instant evacuation ordered. But Sir G. Barlow, having shortly afterwards gone as governor to Madras, and Lord Minto's attention being occupied with other things, the matter remained for some years without further notice; and, in the mean time, the Goorkhas occupied the whole of Bootwul.

Emboldened by the indifference thus manifested, in 1810-11, they crossed the small river that forms the boundary of Bootwul, and began to occupy some villages of the adjoining Perguna of Palee. They also advanced from Sheecoraj, till at last their encroachments in this quarter again attracted the attention of government; and in the beginning of 1812, after remonstrating against the aggressions, Lord Minto repeated Sir G. Barlow's offer, to resign his right to Sheecoraj, on condition of the immediate evacuation of Bootwul and all subsequent occupations. Bheem Sein's father, Unur Singh, who was now the Goorkha governor of Palpa, answered the proposition on this occasion by asserting a distinct right to all he had taken, and even to more. This circumstance, combined with what occurred simultaneously on the Sarun frontier, induced the British government to nominate a Commissioner, and to invite the Goorkhas to send others to meet

him, in order to settle finally the boundary line of the respective territories. Considering that the peremptory demand made by Sir G. Barlow in 1805 for the evacuation of Bootwul, had been answered by an offer to farm it, which was a distinct admission of our right, the nomination of a Commission to investigate the matter now, before enforcing the evacuation, was an act of most exemplary and undeserved moderation.

What had passed, however, on the Sarun frontier remains to be told. The lands forming the Jageer of Ubdoolah remained, as resigned by Mr. Hastings, in the hands of the Nipálese, without aggression on the Betia territory, till the end of 1810, as has been before-mentioned. In 1811, one Luchungeer, the Goorkha Sooba (governor) of Roteebut, crossed the frontier with a party of armed men; and having seized and stockaded Kewya, one of the twenty-two\* villages occupied in Prithee Nurayun's time, began plun-

\* As these twenty two villages are continually recurring, it may be useful to give their names, and to state that they all lie to the South of the ruins of Sumroun:—1. Djbunee, 2. Atmoha, 3. Gara Suhun; 4. Sree Nugur, a Tola; 5. Kewya, or Byrajputee; 6. Poornyha; 7. Korya; 8. Sumunpoor; 9. Busuntpoor, 10. Bejee; 11. Bhulooa; 12. Kudumooa; 13. Bunkutna; 14. Nemya; 15. Pukureea; 16. Kurwa; 17. Ambooa, a Tola; 18. Jujhoora; 19. Gogawa; 20. Sumree; 21. Khugaree; 22. Chynpoor, a Tola of Kurwa, No. 16.

dering and making collections in eight others of them, stating that they belonged to Roteebut. The Raja of Betia's people resisted this aggression, and an affray followed, in which Luchungeer was killed. This occurred on the 19th of June, 1811. The British government, on first hearing of the circumstance, directed the Assistant to the Magistrate of Sarun to proceed to the frontier, in order to inquire into the particulars of the affray; but, before he arrived there, a reinforcement had been sent down from Katmandoo, which immediately seized on the whole of the twenty-two villages. Mr. Young's proceedings were, therefore, confined to the ascertainment of this fact, and of the circumstances of Luchungeer's death; both which being established, he submitted his report, and returned to Sarun. In this stage, the case was referred for the investigation of the Commissioner, whom it had already been resolved to send to Gourukpoor, and the instructions as to the further measures to be adopted were addressed to him.

Major Paris Bradshaw, first Assistant to the Resident at Lukhnou, was the person nominated by Lord Minto to settle these frontier disputes; and in the season 1812-13 he met the Goorkha Commissioners in the Gourukpoor part of the Turæe, and proceeded first to investigate the title they preferred to Bootwul and Shecoraj.

The inquiry was extended to both estates, in consequence of the court at Katmandoo not having closed with either of our offers to resign the latter conditionally.

The result of the investigation established the facts above related, in regard to Bootwul, beyond the possibility of doubt. Sheeraj was proved to have been seized by the Goorkhas sixteen years before the cession of Gourukpoor to us; and great importance was attached by them to some perwanas, or written orders, addressed by British commanders to the Goorkha Sooba, at the time of Vizeer Ulee's flight from Bunarus to the Turace, after the murder of Mr. Cherry, in 1798. They argued that the demand then made of aid for that delinquent's apprehension, implied an acknowledgment of right to the territory within which the exertion was called for. The documents were certainly evidence to the power and possession of the Goorkhas; two points which were not denied; but for ten of the sixteen years they had held Sheeraj, the revenue had been accounted for to the Amils of the Nuwah Vizeer's government, while the origin of the Goorkha title was clearly traced to open usurpation.

The investigation having been brought to this issue, Major Bradshaw was instructed to demand the evacuation both of Bootwul and Sheeraj. The Goorkha Commissioners declared

themselves not satisfied, and begged to refer the matter to Katmandoo. The Major accordingly submitted his proceedings for the orders of his government, while he himself went on to the Sarun frontier.

Here it was in his instructions that he should insist on the restitution of the twenty-two villages occupied in 1811, as a preliminary to any investigation of the claim set up by the Goorkhas. After much evasion, he procured this; but when he proposed opening the inquiry, the Nipálese Commissioners, affecting to have taken some personal offence against the Major, refused to have more discussion with him, and suddenly returned to Katmandoo, leaving him alone on the frontier.

This occurred in March 1814, and was evidently a result of the determination formed by the Goorkha government upon the Gourukpoor cases, which had previously been brought to issue.

Lord Minto, being perfectly satisfied with the proceedings forwarded by Major Bradshaw, addressed a letter to the Raja, in June, 1813, demanding the immediate evacuation both of Bootwul and Sheeoraj. The answer to this did not arrive till December: it was replete with fulsome professions of respect and attachment; but declared the right of the Goorkhas to both Bootwul and Sheeoraj to have been clearly established by the result of the investigation. No reasons were assigned, and as far as concerned Bootwul at least,

the assertion seemed to be in the face of all the evidence. Lord Hastings, who had in the interval assumed charge of the government, as soon as he had examined the voluminous proceedings and papers, and made himself master of the case, addressed to the Raja of Nipál a peremptory requisition to evacuate the two districts; and he sent the letter through the Magistrate of Gourukpoor, giving that officer authority to order the advance of a body of troops to occupy the contested lands, in case the Raja's order for their evacuation should not arrive within twenty-five days from the date of his forwarding the letter. The Goorkha government was further informed that the Magistrate had these orders.

It was the receipt of this letter that had produced the sensation at Katmandoo, which occasioned the sudden recall of the Commissioners from Sarun, and ended in the resolution to abide the issue of war. In April 1814, a council was held, at which the Goorkha Commissioners from the frontier, and two and twenty others of the principal people of the court, were present, and the question of war or peace was fairly debated, in a sitting which lasted from nine o'clock in the morning till eight at night.

There were some in the council who had apprehensions of the result; but an overweening confidence in their own power and resources, and the

Gourukpoor, the disputes on the Sarun frontier were fast coming to the same issue. The Marquess of Hastings, on first hearing of the conduct of the Nipálese Commissioners, ordered the permanent annexation to the British territories of the twenty-two villages, and the other disputed tracts of that frontier; and he sent a force of a few companies, which remained in the Turace during the rains, to secure this quarter. The formal declaration of war was purposely delayed till the close of the rains, in order to allow time for persons engaged in trade with Nipál to withdraw their capital, as well as to give the Nipálese the opportunity of disavowing the act of Munraj, and punishing the perpetrators, if so inclined. They showed no disposition to do so; but, on the contrary, made the most active military preparations along the whole extent of their frontier. The declaration of war was accordingly at length issued by his Lordship from Lukhnou, on the 1st November, 1814.

The aggressions on the Sarun and Gourukpoor frontiers are the only ones that have been related at length, and were doubtless the most important; but there were innumerable others equally unwarranted, along the whole Turace. The magistrate of Tirhoot reported, that between 1787 and 1813 upwards of two hundred villages had been seized on one or other unjustifiable pretext. On the Purneah frontier, the Goorkha governor of Morung had,

in 1808, seized the whole Zemindaree of Bheem-nugur; but this case being particularly flagrant, was taken up immediately, and in June 1809, a detachment under an officer was sent to the frontier, when the Nipâlese, yielding to the threat of an immediate appeal to the sword, evacuated the lands in the course of 1810. Towards Rohilkhand the Goorkhas had seized five of eight Talooks, composing the Perguna of Khyreegurh: three of which were taken before and two after the cession to us in 1801. They also advanced a claim to Kasheepoor, and other lands of Moradabad; but were deterred from seizing them. In the Seikh country, beyond the Jumna, Umur Singh, the Goorkha commander, was engaged in hostilities with Sunsar-Chund, of Kankra, and with other hill Rajas, who held likewise lands in the plains; to which, as each successively fell before him, he advanced a claim. In 1813 he came down and seized some villages on this plea; but on receiving a vigorous remonstrance from Major-General, then Colonel, Ochterlony, who commanded at Loodhecana, he retired. It appeared, indeed, that both his situation and general views of policy made him averse to pushing things to extremity with the British; and he early expressed a decided opinion against the measures adopted in Bootwul and Shecoraj, which he declared to have originated in the selfish views of persons, who scrupled



not to involve the nation in war to gratify their personal avarice.\* The insinuation was levelled at Bheem Sein, whose father had made the usurpation, and whose family derived most of the advantages. The revenue of the usurped lands, it is to be observed, could not have been less than a lack of rupees a year to the Goorkhas, taken altogether, in the manner they collected it : the retention of this income was therefore an object of no small importance to the ambitious views of Bheem Sein, and to the preservation of the influence he had contrived to establish for his family.

\* Vide Umur Singli's opinion in reply to the question submitted by the Raja, Appendix A.; also his intercepted letter, B.

## CHAPTER III.

## NIPAL WAR.—FIRST CAMPAIGN.

1814.

Governor General leaves the Presidency—Plan of operations—General Gillespie's division takes the field—his failure before Nalapanee—and death—Second assault—unsuccessful—Evacuation of the fort, and pursuit of the garrison—Change of plan—General Martindell takes the command—Operations against Jythuk—Defeat of Major Ludlow's detachment—Major Richards retires with loss—General Ochterlony's division—Capture of Nalagurh—Umur Singh's position at Ramgurh—Skirmish before it—Operations to turn its flank—Affair at Deboo ka Tibia—New position of Umur Singh—General Ochterlony's movement on Belaspoor—Occupation of Maloun ridge by Umur Singh—Gourukpoor division—General J. S. Wood's unsuccessful attack of Bootwul—Defensive proceedings—Sarun frontier—Attempt of Chundur Seekur Opadheea to negotiate—Defeat of Purseram Thapa by Major Bradshaw—General Marley's arrival—Posts of Captains Blackney and Sibley cut off by the Nipalese—Indecision of the General—his departure from camp—Sikkim Raja gained by Major Latter—Repulse of the enemy at one of his outposts.

THE Marquess of Hastings, very soon after his arrival in India, determined to make a tour of inspection to the western provinces. Accordingly,

in prosecution of this intention, he embarked at Calcutta in June 1814, and reached Cawnpoor (Kan, hpoor) by the end of September, after a tedious navigation up the Ganges. The discussion with the Nipâlese had been brought to issue by the murder of the police-officers in Gourukpoor, a short time before his Lordship left the presidency. The interval of the journey, therefore, was employed in preparation for the vigorous prosecution of the war in the hills, and in defensive arrangements against the probability of another violation of our frontier by the Pindarees. The leaders of those associations might, it was thought, be tempted to seize the opportunity to annoy us that would be afforded by the employment of our troops in the opposite direction. The nature, however, of the defensive arrangements resolved upon will be explained hereafter. First, we shall relate the occurrences of the campaign in the hills, and it will be convenient to pursue them without interruption from their commencement in October 1814, to the close of the campaign in April of the following year.

The frontier which was to be the scene of war stretched a distance of about six hundred miles; and the enemy had the command of all the passes of the forest, as well as the hills. This, and the general suspiciousness of the Goorkha character, rendered it extremely difficult for Lord Hastings to

collect intelligence for the arrangement of his plan of operations. He, nevertheless, resolved to act offensively against the enemy along the whole line of frontier, from the Sutlej to the Koossee ; and the following was the allotment ultimately made of this space to the several divisions that were brought into the field.

It was assigned to Colonel Ochterlony,\* who commanded the post established at Loodheecana in 1808-9, to operate in the hilly country lying near the Sutlej. The force under this officer's command was exclusively native infantry and artillery, and amounted to about six thousand men ; it had a train of two 18-pounders, ten 6-pounders, and four mortars and howitzers.

From Meeruth in the Dooab, Major-general Gillespie, whose conduct at Vellore and in Java had given his name a high celebrity, was to proceed first against the Dehra Doon (a rich valley stretching between the Ganges and Jumna, within the first range of hills), and as soon as this should be reduced, which it was expected would not be an operation of much time or difficulty, the force was to divide; and while a detachment attacked Gurhwal and Sirinugur, under the snowy range, the main body was to proceed against Nahn, to

\* This officer's commission of Major-general arrived soon after the opening of the campaign ; we shall therefore henceforth designate him as of that rank.

the west of the Jumna, in aid of the operations of Major-general Ochterlony against Umur Singh. General Gillespie's force originally consisted of his Majesty's 53d, which, with artillery and a few dismounted dragoons, made up about one thousand Europeans, and two thousand five hundred native infantry. This division, and that under General Ochterlony, were ordered to take the field towards the end of October; the unhealthy season of the rains being generally over to the north-west by the beginning or middle of this month. Kumaon, and Almora, its capital, were to be attacked from Rohilkhund; but, according to the original plan, this movement was to follow the occupation of Gurhwal to the north of the province; and the operations undertaken here in December and January were an after-thought, suggested by the peculiar circumstances that attended the commencement of the war.

From Bunarus and Gourukpoor a force was collected, and placed under the command of Major-general John Sullivan Wood, and his instructions were to penetrate by Bootwul into Palpa. This division consisted of his Majesty's 17th foot, nine hundred and fifty strong, and about three thousand native infantry; it had a train of seven 6 and 3-pounders, and four mortars and howitzers. The 15th of November was fixed upon as the day on which this force was to take the field at Gourukpoor.

Further east from Patna and Moorshedabad, another force of a strength of near eight thousand men, including his Majesty's 24th foot, nine hundred and seven strong, was collected for the main attack, which was intended to be made direct upon the capital of Katmandoo by the passes between the Gunduk and Bagmuttee. Major-general Marley was intrusted with the command of this army, and there was a train attached to it of four 18-pounders, eight 6 and 3-pounders, and fourteen mortars and howitzers. The Ganges was to be crossed by the troops from Patna on the 15th of November; and a further brigade was formed, from troops at more distant stations, to follow the army and secure its depôts and rear, as it advanced into the hills.

Beyond the Koosce eastward, Major Latter was furnished with two thousand men, including his district battalion, for the defence of the Poornea frontier. This officer was desired to open a communication with the petty Raja of Sikhim, and to give him every assistance and encouragement to expel the Goorkhas from the eastern hills, short of an actual advance of troops for the purpose. The Raja's minister had invited the common enemy, who thus had acquired a footing at Nagree and in the pass of Nagurkôt; but little advance had yet been made by the Nipàlese in

the subjugation of the country, and the struggle with the Raja's adherents was still actively going on when the declaration of war issued. Sikhim is tributary to Lassa and the Chinese : the frontier towards the plains is small, being bounded by the Teesta to the east, and by the Michee to the west ; but the territory extends northward to the snowy range, and was found to afford a more ready communication with Lassa and China than that through Bootan, by which route Messrs. Bogle and Turner penetrated in Mr. Hastings' time.

Such were the dispositions made for the campaign. Major-general Gillespie was the first to penetrate the enemy's frontier. On the 22nd of October he seized the Keree pass leading into the Doon, and thence proceeded to Dehra, the principal town in the valley, without meeting any opposition. The whole of the hill country, west of the Ganges, was still under Umur Singh ; who had allotted a force of about six hundred men under the command of Captain \* Bulbhudur Singh,

\* The use of English terms for their grades of command was general in the Goorkha army, but the powers of the different ranks did not correspond with those of our system. The title of General was assumed by Bheem Sein, as Commander-in-chief, and enjoyed by himself alone ; of Colonels, there were three or four only ; all principal officers of the court, commanding more than one battalion. The title of

for the defence of the Doon. About five miles from Dehra was a hill five or six hundred feet high, surmounted with a fort of no great size or strength, called Nalapanee. Here Bulbhudur resolved to make his stand: and employed himself in strengthening and adding to the works, which were still in an unfinished state, when General Gillespie appeared in the neighbourhood.

Misled, in some degree, by his information as to the strength of the place, which had been collected before Bulbhudur had put in hand his recent additions, the Major-general first sent on Colonel Mawbey, with a detachment, to expel the garrison, intending to march immediately with his main body on Nahn. Colonel Mawbey, however, seeing the nature of the works, was deterred from attempting any thing, and solicited fresh instructions. Upon this, the General himself advanced with his whole army; and, after a rapid reconnoissance, resolved on carrying Nalapanee by assault. On the 30th of October he seized, with a part of his force, one end of the table-land, or rather ridge, which, being more than half a mile

Major was held by the adjutant of a battalion or independent company; and Captain was the next grade to colonel, implying the command of a corps. *Lufiun*, or *Lieutenant*, was the style of the officers commanding companies under the Captain; and then followed the subaltern ranks of *Soobadar*, *Jemadar*, and *Havildar*, without any *Ensigns*.



in length, was not fully occupied by the fort. Here he formed a hasty battery at six hundred yards for his light guns, intending to try the assault next day. In the course of the night he disposed his division in four parties, which, upon a given signal, were to move simultaneously from the battery and surrounding valleys, with ladders, to escalate the walls. Unfortunately, the signal to be given was the firing of guns in a particular manner from the battery ; a method of communication at all times open to accident, and particularly uncertain in a rugged country like that in which Nalapance was situated, where the columns were necessarily out of sight of the battery ; and some of them so far off, that the report could not be heard distinctly. The Major-general also gave the officers commanding each column reason to expect the signal after ten o'clock in the day ; but having early in the morning fired for some time on the walls, without producing so much effect as he expected, the impetuosity of his temper led him to give the signal an hour before the time. Hence it was only obeyed, when given, by two of the four columns, those led by Colonel Carpenter, and Major Ludlow ; the former six hundred and eleven strong, and the latter, nine hundred and thirty-nine ; officers included. Captain Bulbhudur had made the best possible preparations for defence ; besides manning the walls, he opened the wicket

gate, which jutted out so as to enfilade a great part of the wall, then barring the entrance with cross beams, he planted a gun through the embrasure thus formed, and loaded it with grape.

The column approached steadily under a heavy fire of musquetry from the walls, but ignorant of this arrangement to take them in flank. Lieutenant Ellis led his pioneers close under the wall, where they planted the ladders. He was, however, killed immediately after, by the fire of the gun before mentioned; and the greater part of the pioneers, and of the head of the column, were swept down with him.

An attempt was then made to gain the wicket, but without effect; whereupon the troops, finding it impossible to enter the place, fell back to the shelter of some huts, at a little distance outside the walls. The Major-general had stayed this while in the battery; but immediately he saw the troops retire, he hastened forward with three fresh companies of the 53d, determined to carry the fort or perish. General Gillespie attempted to lead the columns again to the ramparts; but as the men saw no practicable means of surmounting the wall, he was not so readily followed as he wished. He pushed forward, however, with about a hundred dismounted men of the 8th dragoons; a regiment he had once commanded, and which was much attached to him.

These he led on to within a few yards of the wicket, where, as he was waving his hat, close under the wall, he was shot through the heart, and fell dead. His aidecamp, Major O'Hara, was killed by his side; Captain Byers, his brigademajor, was wounded; and of the men of the 8th dragoons, four were killed, and fifty wounded. The fall of the General was the signal for retreat; and the total loss suffered on this occasion was, besides the General, four officers, and twenty-seven men killed, and fifteen officers and two hundred and thirteen men wounded\*.

General Gillespie's death gave the command to Colonel Mawbey of his Majesty's 53d, the senior officer present. His first act was to retire

\* *Killed*.—Lieut. and Adjut. O'Hara, 6th Native Infantry; Lieut. and Adjut. Gosling, Light Battalion; Ensign Fothergill, 17th Native Infantry; Ensign Ellis, Pioneers.

*Wounded*.—Lieut.-Col. Westcra, slightly; Capt. Bruton, severely; Lieut. Heyman, slightly; Lieut. Taylor, severely; Cornet Macdonald, severely, 8th Light Dragoons.—Lieut. Young and Lieut. Anstice, severely, his Majesty's 53d.—Ensign Davidson, slightly, 7th Native Infantry.—Lieut. Broughton, dangerously, 19th Native Infantry.—Major Wilson, and Lieut. Thackeray, severely; Lieut. Monteath, slightly, Light Battalion.—Lieut. Elliott, Pioneers, severely; Lieut. Blane, Engineers, slightly; Capt. Byers, Aidecamp, severely. Mr. William Fraser, of the Civil Service, the Political Agent with this division, was also wounded on this occasion, by an arrow, in his throat.

to Dehra, until a train of heavy guns could arrive from Dehlee, the nearest depôt. This occupied till the 24th of November; and on the 25th, the army recommenced operations. A battery of 18-pounders was now constructed, within three hundred yards; and by noon of the 27th of November, a large part of the wall was brought down. A sally was attempted from the fort, but the enemy were driven back by grape from the battery; and the breach appearing to be practicable, an assault was ordered the same day. On approaching the breach, some few of the grenadiers of the 53d mounted it; but, being immediately shot from within, the rest of the troops hung back, and remained at a short distance, in perfect self-possession, firing at the garrison; but exposed, in return, to the showers of grape, musquetry, arrows, and even stones, which the enemy poured incessantly from behind their defences. The British officers exerted every effort to induce a second attempt to mount the breach, but without effect. Lieutenant Harrington of the 53d advanced personally, to prove to the men how easily it was to be ascended; but, being unsupported, he fell a victim to his zeal and gallantry. The British commander, seeing from the battery what was passing, thought it would be of good effect to send up one of his light guns, which,

being fired into the breach, might, he conceived, clear it of the enemy, and allow the men to mount in the smoke. Lieutenant Luxford, of the horse-artillery, undertook this perilous service ; but he had no sooner carried up his gun, and executed what was proposed, than he received a mortal wound. The minds of the soldiers were impressed with so superstitious a conviction of the impracticability of the breach, that they would not advance, even with the advantage of the smoke of the gun. The retreat was, therefore, at last sounded, after two hours had been spent by the assailants in the exposed situation above described, at an immense sacrifice of valuable lives. Four officers, Captain Campbell, 6th N. I. ; and Lieutenants Harrington, his Majesty's 53d, Cunningham, 13th N. I., and Luxford, horse-artillery, were killed, with fifteen Europeans and eighteen Natives ; while seven officers\*, two hundred and fifteen Europeans, and two hundred and twenty-one Natives, were wounded on this occasion. Thus, including the loss incurred in the first attack, this petty fortress had already cost us considerably more than the entire number of its garrison.

\* Major Ingleby, Captain Stone, Lieutenants Horsely, Green, and Drodie, and Ensign Aufrere, of his Majesty's 53d ; and Captain Blake of the 13th Native Infantry.

It was now determined to shell the place, in the hope that from the want of bomb-proofs, or other protection from this arm, it might be made untenable. The efforts of the besiegers were also directed against the water, which there was reason to believe was got from without the walls. After three days the wisdom of this plan was shown by the evacuation of the fort; which was left by the remnant of its garrison on the night of the 30th of November. It is truly mortifying to reflect, that the same plan, if adopted at the commencement, must have secured the fall of the place with the same facility; and would thus have saved to the nation all the blood that was spilt, besides the loss of two months of the favourable season, and the disrepute of two disastrous failures. Bulbhudur carried off seventy survivors, all that remained unhurt of his garrison of near six hundred. With these he secretly passed the line of posts established round the fort, and joined a party of about three hundred, which had been sent from Nahn to reinforce the place. They had been seen for some days hovering about the neighbouring hills, but it had not been thought necessary to send a detachment after them. Colonel Mawbey, disappointed that the garrison should escape after all, resolved on an effort to surprise Bulbhudur. He proposed the enterprise to Major Ludlow, who undertook it with alacrity. Having marched the greater part of

the night of the 1st of December, the Major came by surprise upon the Goorkha bivouack ; it dispersed so quickly that only the advance party were in sight of the enemy ; but a number were cut up, and the pursuit was continued for some distance. Captain Bucke, who commanded the advance, and Ensign Richmond, his adjutant, were wounded, with about fifteen of the Sepoys.

Nalapancee, when occupied by Colonel Mawbey, was found in a shocking state, full of the mangled remains of men and women killed by the shot and shells of our batteries ; a number of wounded were likewise lying about, and the stench was intolerable. Upwards of ninety bodies were collected and burnt ; and the wounded were sent to our hospitals ; after which the fort was razed, and Colonel Mawbey proceeded to execute the further operations assigned to the division.

Experience having shown the determined bravery with which we must expect to be opposed, Lord Hastings so far varied his plan of operations as to forego the detachment of a part of this division to occupy Gurhwal. He accordingly instructed Colonel Mawbey to leave a few men in a strong position for the occupation of the Doon, and to carry his undivided army against Umur Singh's son, Colonel Runjoor Singh Thapa, who was, with about two thousand three hundred elite of the Goorkha army, at Nahn. It was further intended to reinforce the division considerably ; and Colonel

Mawbey was informed that the *command* had been conferred on Major-general Martindell. This officer was at a distance, and did not join till the 20th of December. In the mean time Colonel Mawbey had led back the division through the Keree pass, leaving Colonel Carpenter posted at Kal-ee, at the north-western extremity of the Doon. This station commanded the *pas-es* of the Jumna, on the main line of communication between the western and eastern portions of the Goorkha territory, and thus was well chosen for procuring intelligence. The letters to and from Umur Singh and his officers, which developed every secret motive of the Goorkha policy, were chiefly intercepted at this point; and after a short time, the disaffection of the inhabitants, and want of supplies, obliged the Goorkhas to abandon Burat, an elevated and strong position north-east of Kalsee; which, being likewise occupied by Colonel Carpenter, entirely cut off Umur Singh's communication with Kumaon and Katmandoo, except by the very difficult routes close under the snowy range.

The division left the Doon on the 5th of December, and taking the route of the plains, entered the valley below Nahn, by the pass of Kolapanee, and encamped at Moganund on the 19th. Nahn was only seven miles distant, and though upon a hill two thousand feet high, was not deemed by the enemy to be of sufficient strength for their main stand. Accordingly Runjoor Singh had received Umur



Singh's orders to retire to a position north of the town, and to occupy the surrounding heights and the fort of Jythuk, situated at a point where two spurs of mountainous ridges meet, and the peak at the intersection rises to a height of three thousand six hundred feet above the level of the plains of Hindoostan.

General Martindell having ascertained the evacuation of Nahn, caused it to be occupied by Major Ludlow on the 24th of December; and following with his whole force on the 25th, planned an offensive movement against Jythuk, after a cursory examination of the position as it towered to the skies, and exhibited its several peaks to the view from Nahn.

Two detachments were formed to occupy different arms of the ridges above described. Major Richards, of the 13th N. I. was intrusted with one of a strength of seven hundred and thirty-eight men,\* which was to make a detour, and establish itself on a height to the north of Jythuk, subsequently called Peacock-hill. Major Ludlow, of the 6th N. I. was intrusted with the command of the other, which was to occupy the southern and nearest arm to Nahn: its strength was a thousand fighting

\* Major Richards:—light company of his Majesty's 53d; three and a half light companies of Native Infantry; the battalion companies of the 1st Battalion, 13th Native Infantry, and 50 Pioneers.



men.\* Mountain-guns, on elephants, were attached to each detachment, but the ground was too rugged to allow of their keeping up on the march. The roads, indeed, were mere mountain pathways, difficult of ascent for a single person, without arms, or accoutrements; and scarcely in any part admitting a march of troops otherwise than by single files.

Major Richards, having farthest to go, set off an hour earlier; but Major Ludlow, who moved at midnight, came first upon the enemy. He fell in with Runjoor Singh's outer picquet at three in the morning, at about a mile's distance from the point to be occupied. The party retired, and the Major's advance-guard pushed up the hill in pursuit, exposed to its irregular fire. At the top of the hill was the village and temple of Jumpta in ruins, where was a second post of the Nipálese, which similarly retired.

Major Ludlow pushed on immediately with the grenadier company of the 53d, in order to seize the point assigned to him; and on reaching it called a halt, until the rest of his detachment should come up and enable him to secure himself. There was, however, a stockade a little further on, and the grenadiers, mistaking for pusillanimity in the

\* Major Ludlow: grenadier company of his Majesty's 53d, three and a half light companies Native Infantry, nine companies of the 1st bat. 6th Native Infantry, and fifty pioneers.

enemy the easy acquisition they had made of several defensible points, thought to redeem the credit that had been lost before Nalapanee, and crowding round the Major entreated to be allowed to storm the post. The impulse of the troops was in unison with the natural ardour of the commander, and he gave way at the sacrifice of his better judgment. He saw, indeed, that the stockade itself was of no great strength, and he thought it might be carried by a coup-de-main before the Nipâlese should have time to reinforce its garrison. The occurrences at Nalapanee ought to have suggested greater caution.

Juspao Thapa, Runjoor Singh's best officer, was the Goorkha commandant here; and the greater part of the force at Jythuk had, on the first alarm, been collected within or behind the stockade out of sight of the assailants. Juspao allowed the British to come close under the stockade, and then from either side, a little down the ridge, he pushed out parties round both flanks, who opened a fire on the grenadiers from all quarters at once. Not having expected such a reception, the men were confounded, and drew back; whereupon the Goorkhas, seizing the opportunity, charged them sword in hand from the stockade, and, in the end, drove the detachment from all the ground it had gained, in spite of three efforts of Major Ludlow to rally his men. On coming to the Jumpta temple, the Major found his

main body of native infantry still unformed, and standing confusedly, in a state to afford no support. Indeed, the Sepahees, on seeing the Europeans giving way before the enemy, were panic-struck, and could be brought to no order by the few officers that remained with them. The retreat to Nahn after this was a perfect flight, in which we suffered severely; and so quickly did it pass, that the detachment had returned to camp by ten o'clock in the day; having lost thirty-one Europeans and about one hundred and twenty natives killed and wounded. Lieutenant Munt, 1st N. I. was amongst the former, and there were three officers\* in the latter return.

Major Richards had a detour of sixteen miles to make before he could reach the post assigned to him, to the north. It was eight in the morning, therefore, before he came to the foot of the ridge on which he was to establish himself. Finding water, he halted till ten, to allow the men to refresh themselves after the march; then continuing his advance, he came on the enemy's first picquet at about a mile from Jythuk, and, following as it retired, took possession of all the ridge to Peacock-hill, within eight hundred yards of the fort. The water of the position was three hundred yards below in a hollow to the left, which rendered a separate post

\* Lieutenant Scott, 5th; Lieutenant Donnelly, 27th; Lieutenant Sayer, 6th N. I.

there necessary. The defensive arrangements were complete by noon; but the troops were astonished to hear nothing in the direction of Major Ludlow's post; where, indeed, every thing was over some time before Major Richards arrived at his ground.

While the troops were speculating on this subject, Runjoor Singli's drums beat to arms; and at about one o'clock he paraded his whole force under the walls of Jythuk, preparatory to an attack. The mountaineers advanced boldly at first, but not being able to face a steady volley, they separated; and availing themselves with wonderful dexterity of every jutting rock or the like that afforded cover, kept up a continued irregular fire, charging every now and then when there was any advantage to gain. The ground was, for the most part, too rugged to allow of a charge to dislodge these isolated parties, consequently, during the whole day, our troops had to abide this method of attack without having any cover to shelter them.

At four P. M. Major Richards, fearing that his ammunition would not last, for the bullocks and hill-porters\* with the spare rounds had not come up, wrote to Major-general Martindell to solicit a

\* These were under an escort of the rear-guard, which had separated from the column in the dark of the night, and, losing its way, was observed and cut off by a party from one of Runjoor Singh's stockades.

reinforcement. At the same time, as the Goorkhas were beginning to be more bold and troublesome, he concentrated his force, and gave up the post at the watering-place. By sunset nine charges had been made by the enemy, and repulsed each time by a volley; but as it became necessary to husband the ammunition, the pioneers were employed in collecting stones, which the position was steep enough to render an effectual weapon of defence.

Thus was the post maintained till half-past seven, two hours after sunset, when a positive order arrived from the Major-general to retire. Major Richards had not by this time lost more than twenty or thirty men; but having now no hope of a reinforcement, or of fresh ammunition, he had no choice but to obey. He made, therefore, the best dispositions for retreat that his circumstances would admit; but as there was only a single narrow pathway for the troops to file down, and that skirted sometimes the most tremendous precipices, so as to require careful footing, confusion and loss would have been inevitable, had it been broad day: by night it was, of course, much worse.

The important duty of covering the retreat was undertaken by Lieutenant Thackeray, with his light company belonging to the 26th N. I. This officer's self-devotion contributed mainly to save the detachment from being entirely cut off; for while the troops were filing down the

pathway, his company kept the whole Goorkha force in check, charging them several times in different directions. Its situation, of course, grew every instant more desperate, still not a man of the company thought of his individual safety while the Lieutenant lived to command. After more than half of his men had fallen, he was himself at last killed; and Ensign Wilson, who served under him, fell nearly at the same time. The covering party was then overpowered, and it was supposed at first that the company had been cut off to a man; but it was found afterwards that Runjoor Singh had given quarter to about forty men and a soobadar, whom he treated well, and, having vainly tempted to enlist in his ranks, dismissed a few days after on parole not to serve again during the war. Every thing was in confusion in the rear after Lieutenant Thackeray's fall; but most of the troops had filed down the pathway while he was engaged, so that the loss, on the whole, after the stragglers had come in, was three officers killed,\* five wounded; and of the men, seventy-eight under the former, and about two hundred and twenty under the latter return. The number of missing, whose fate was for some days uncertain, greatly swelled the first returns; and six officers were amongst

\* Killed.—Lieutenant Thackeray, 2-26th Native Infantry; Ensign Wilson, 2-26th Native Infantry; Ensign Stalkart, 1-13th Native Infantry.



these; but the last, Lieutenant Turner, came in on the 1st January, three days after, having had several hair-breadth escapes.

The disasters of this day were owing solely to the irretrievable error of Major Ludlow, in allowing himself to attempt the stockade before he had formed his men, and established the post he was ordered to occupy. Had he first secured his footing on the ridge, those who were driven back would have found a point to rally upon, and the attempt at a coup-de-main, whether successful or not, would have been of no consequence. It must, at the same time, be acknowledged that had the native troops been sufficiently officered, it would have been easy to have made head at the Jumpta temple; and it was natural for Major Ludlow to conclude that he would have found his main body ready formed there to support him; but the fault of the system, and the casualties of the war, had unfortunately so thinned the ranks of officers,\* that the nine companies of the 1st bat. 6th N. I. had no more than three on duty, and this deficiency was the principal cause of the disastrous event on this side.

The prudence and good conduct of Major Richards in the occupation and defence of his po-

sition, produced one most advantageous result, as it fully convinced the troops of this division of their great superiority over the enemy in a fair combat. Every man of the detachment felt that had the post been reinforced, or even furnished with fresh ammunition, it might easily have been maintained. Hence the loss was attributed to its proper cause, and the effect of the day's struggle was not diminished by the subsequent retreat. Still, however, something more decisive was wanting to restore complete confidence; and many circumstances contributed at this particular juncture to lead to an exaggerated estimate of the military character of the Goorkha nation.

Thus closed the year 1814 upon this division. No active enterprize was for some time afterwards attempted by Major-general Martindell; but, before relating the operations in which the rest of the season was consumed by him, it may be as well to show what was passing in other quarters, which had similarly become the scene of war.

General Ochterlony, who took the field at the same time with Gillespie, and was opposed to Umur Singh in person, formed from the first a just estimate of the character of his enemy, and of the difficulties he would have to encounter. He resolved, therefore, to proceed with the utmost caution. On the 21st of October, 1814, he moved from the camp of Gillespie's army, 2-26th Native Infantry, to a valley within 1-13th Native Infantry.

the hills, which he entered from the Sutlej, by a pass less difficult than most of those further east. Umur Singh was at this time at Urkee, considerably within the hills. They run here in broken ridges, stretching N.N.W.; and each ridge affords, of course, a series of positions. The outermost ridge was surmounted by the fort of Nalagurh, which, with an outpost at Taragurh, commanded the principal route into the hills. On the next range stood Ramgurh, Joorjooree, Chamba, and a second Taragurh; above this again, towered the heights of Maloun; behind which, lay Urkee on one side, and on the other the capital of Umur Singh's staunch ally the Raja of Belaspoor. Between, was a comparatively fruitful valley, whence Umur Singh could draw his supplies in case of his occupying any of the above ridges.

Having thrown garrisons into the forts of the Nalagurh and Ramgurh hills, and reckoning, apparently, that General Ochterlony would be occupied some time before them, Umur Singh was in no hurry to leave his position at Urkee. The British General, resolving to put nothing to hazard, made a road with great labour, and sat himself down, with his heavy guns, before Nalagurh on the 1st of November. Having breached the wall, the garrison surrendered on the 5th, capitulating also for the stockade on the same ridge, called Taragurh. Umur Singh came down, and took position

on the Ramgurh range the same day, leaving small garrisons at Urkee and Sabathoo behind him.

Having established depôts at the captured forts, Major-general Ochterlony proceeded, on the 13th of November, against the Ramgurh positions, sending on Colonel Thompson with a brigade one day's march in advance. The position of Ramgurh was so steep on the side towards the plains, that the Major-general determined to turn it if possible, and operate on its rear. These ridges, it must be observed, are all so many steps to the Heemachul; each, therefore, as it approximates to that stupendous range, towers over that before it, and as you look from the plains, the steeper side is always opposed to you.

Ramgurh stood nearly in the middle of the ridge, and formed Umur Singh's right. Major-general Ochterlony, in advancing from Nalagurh, turned his left; and in the course of November had seized a point from which he hoped to be able to batter one of the stockades of that wing. By the 26th of November, after immense labour in making roads and dragging up the guns, a battery was constructed for 6-pounders; but when it began to play, the stockade was found to be so distant, and so much the higher of the two, that the shot had little effect. Lieutenant Lawtie, the engineer, seeing this, advanced with a small party

to reconnoitre another point a little further on. The Goorkhas, however, sallied out to prevent this, and obliged him to seek the shelter of an old wall that stood near. His critical situation being observed, Lieutenant Williams was sent with two companies from the battery to support the reconnoissance; but a much stronger body came down to the Goorkhas and surrounded the whole party; who thus found themselves under the necessity of cutting their way through the enemy, to secure their retreat\*. The manœuvre was successfully executed; but with the loss of Lieutenant Williams, who was killed, besides seventy-five Sepoys killed and wounded. This affair was of no manner of consequence, except as it afforded to the enemy an occasion of triumph. Next day the Goorkhas gave permission to remove and bury the dead,—a

\* The author of the *Military Sketches of the Goorka War* gives a different account of this affair.

He says that Lieutenant Lawtie, in the course of his reconnoissance, came suddenly on a post, which he deemed it safer to attack than to retreat from. He carried it; but the Goorkhas being reinforced turned upon him; and his Sepoys, after firing away the upper layer of their cartridges, abandoned the post and fled. Lieutenant Williams, who was moving to the support, was, he states, similarly abandoned by his men, who were panic-struck, and fled without exerting themselves. The account given in the text was prepared from official records, before the work here cited was published. The latter will be better authority.

courtesy they never refused during the war, and not the only one we experienced at their hands. General Ochterlony was busily employed all this while in surveying and improving the roads, and reconnoitering Umur Singh's position on every side. By the 2d of December he was enabled to form a plan of attack, the object of which was to make a lodgment on a point within the position. The advance was to be made from the battery above mentioned, and was extremely hazardous; inasmuch as there was but one road to the point, and that led under fire of one of Umur Singh's principal stockades, which the advancing column would have to receive on its flank, and perhaps to abide a sally from the garrison as it passed. However, seeing no other way of seriously annoying the enemy, the Major-general submitted the plan to his two Brigadiers, Colonels Arnold and Thompson, in order to learn their opinion of it. The propriety of making the attack was still under deliberation, when news arrived of the second failure before Nalapanee; and General Ochterlony also heard of a reinforcement being on its way to his own army, by order of Lord Hastings, which determined him to abandon the plan, and thenceforth to put nothing to hazard. The Major-general had at this time serious doubts of our ultimate success in the struggle, and he feared that our native army, with all its discipline, would be found

ill adapted to warfare in a country too rugged to admit of its superior tactics being brought to play. These apprehensions were, however, expressed to none but his Commander-in-Chief; nor could his most familiar associates detect in his demeanour the slightest interruption of that cheerful flow of spirits by which Sir D. Ochterlony has been characterized through life.

While waiting the arrival of the promised reinforcement, Major-general Ochterlony exerted himself in winning over the Plascea Raja,\* and having succeeded in this object, he got him to lend his exertions in making a road for artillery from Mukran, by Khundnee, to Nehur, three miles N.N.E. of Ramgurh, where he had for some time fixed his head-quarters. This was preparatory to an attempt to carry some points in Umur Singh's rear. On the 27th of December, the 2nd bat. 7th N. I., with an additional train of light guns, having joined, Colonel Thompson was detached, with fourteen strong companies, two guns, and two howitzers, to attack two stockades which were opposed to General Ochterlony's right, and were situated on a kind of spur from the Ramgurh ridge, projecting north-eastwards in Umur Singh's rear. The stockades were, if possible, to be carried, and a third point, on which there was no stockade, was

\* Raja Ram Surwa Sen was at this time Raja of Hindor and Plascea.

then to be occupied by the detachment. Colonel Thompson set off in the night, and late in the morning came opposite the first stockade; but on reconnoitering, thought it not safe to try a coup-de-main. He passed on, therefore, in order to seize a ridge about seven hundred yards distant from a stone redoubt belonging to the enemy, and which led to within five hundred yards of Deboo-ka Tibia, the second stockade to be attacked. Here he waited for his guns, and on their arrival fired at Deboo till night, in the hope of effecting a breach. The Goorkha defences are generally proof against light artillery; hence, no impression being made, Colonel Thompson was compelled to be satisfied with establishing himself on the ridge. In the course of the night the Goorkhas evacuated Deboo-ka Tibia, which Colonel Thompson discovering, sent a party to occupy. The Goorkhas further employed the night in concentrating their force, preparatory to a strong effort to dislodge the detachment. Just before daybreak they commenced a serious attack from a stockade called Mungoo-ka Dhar, which crowned the heights of the Ramgurh ridge, at the point where it was joined by that on which Deboo was situated. The detachment was well on its guard, and drove back the Goorkhas after a few vollies, with a loss of near one hundred and fifty men, whereof sixty were counted on the ground. We had twelve killed, and fifty-



seven wounded, but no officer was of the number. General Ochterlony, on hearing the firing, sent the 2nd bat. 7th N. I. to reinforce the post ; and in the course of the 29th of December, it was stockaded afresh, and otherwise secured. It has been mentioned that Ramgurh formed Umur Singh's right as his position fronted the plains. Colonel Thompson's present post was in the rear of his centre, so as entirely to intercept the supplies he received by the Urkee road, and to incommode the communication with Belaspoor. Seeing this, the Goorkha General shifted his ground, deserted all his stockades to the left of Ramgurh, and keeping that fort still as his right, took up a reversed position on the other side of it, so as to oppose a new front to our army, which had turned his left. Umar Singh likewise strengthened Mungoo-ka Dhar, and made it his head-quarters. It was soon found that the ridge on which Colonel Thompson was lodged did not afford any means of approaching the main stockades of the enemy's new position, the intervening ground being particularly rugged. It hence became necessary to devise a different plan of operations, and on the 16th of January, General Ochterlony, still seeking the means of straitening the enemy's supplies, which, since the occupation of the Urkee and Subathoo roads, had been drawn wholly from Belaspoor, put in execution the following masterly movement :—Crossing the

Gumba river from Nehur, north-east of Ramgurh, he went along the Urkee road, till he turned the Maloun ridge, and thence, sending on Colonel Thompson a-head, made a long detour in the direction of Belaspoor. By the 18th of January a party of irregulars, under Captain Ross, occupied the heights of Punalee, commanding Belaspoor, and the valley of the Sutlej, in which it is situated. Colonel Thompson was at the same time a kos beyond Jynugur, on the road to the same place, and General Ochterlony himself about to join him. Thus Belaspoor was open ; and the power of operating against the north-east face of Maloun, from the valley of the Gumrora, gained. At the same time that this movement was made, Colonel Arnold was left at Deboo-ka Tibia, to watch Umur Singh ; and, as it was expected that he would not quietly wait the result, the Colonel had instructions to be on the look-out for a move ; and, if the Goorkha army likewise took the route of Belaspoor, to occupy the stockades that would be abandoned, and follow at its heels by a road that would place the enemy between the two British divisions, each of which was more than a match for his whole force. If the Goorkhas merely retired to Maloun, leaving garrisons in the Ramgurh stockades, Mungoo was to be first proceeded against, in order to maintain the direct communication with the plains and other divisions ; and as soon as that

established himself at the extremity of the Maloun range; subsequently he reduced Rutungurh,—a fort disjointed from the ridge, but lying directly between Maloun and Belaspoor.

Some time was consumed in reducing the Rangurh forts; and, during the interval, General Ochterlony employed himself in bringing over the Raja of Belaspoor, who, after an unsuccessful attempt to dislodge Captain Ross from the Punalee heights, had fled across the Sutlej. This Raja, though connected with Umur Singh's family by a recent marriage, was induced at last, through fear of seeing his capital and country given over to another, to make his terms and submit.

Here we shall leave this division for the present, in order to bring on the operations in the Turaces of Gôurukpoor and Buhar. *Umur Singh* had fully justified the reputation he enjoyed as a soldier, by the manner in which he met, and sometimes defeated, the sagacious plans of the British commander. Nothing decisive, indeed, had yet been done by either army; but, considering that the British had been reinforced to near seven thousand men, while *Umur Singh* had never more than two thousand eight hundred, or at the most three thousand, this was the best possible proof of the skill with which he had availed himself of the advantage of ground, which was all he had to compensate for his numerical inferiority.

The division assembled at Gourukpoor was ordered to take the field on the 15th November ; but, owing to the difficulty of collecting hill-porters for the carriage of the baggage and supplies in sufficient abundance in that thinly-peopled district, it was late in December before Major-general J. S. Wood proceeded into the Turæe. Having waited some time to collect information as to the best mode of penetrating to Palpa, he came at first to the determination of leaving Bootwul to the right, and attacking Nyakot, a post which crowns the hills to the west of the town. Having ascertained, however, that the Goorkhas, under Colonel Wuzeer Singh, a nephew of Bheem Sein's, had taken post at the mouth of the pass, within which Bootwul is situated, and had built there a stockade called Jeetgurh, it was resolved to reconnoitre the works, and carry them, if possible, before proceeding further. On the 3d of January, General Wood marched from his camp at Simra, in the Turæe, with twenty-one companies of infantry to put this plan in execution. He acted on the information of a Brahmin, in the employ of the family of the old Palpa Raja, residing at Gourukpoor, and the Brahmin offered his services as guide. The road ran along the banks of the Tenavee, which here is likewise called Goonghce, and the last seven miles of the way led through the Sâl forest ; but General

Wood had been told to expect an open space immediately about the stockade. He was himself, with the advanced guard, still in the thick of the forest, when the road brought them suddenly in front of the stockade, at not more than fifty yards distance. A smart and destructive fire was immediately opened on the advanced party, and the General's Brigade-major, Captain Hiatt, and subsequently his engineer officer, Lieutenant Morrieson, were wounded, the latter mortally. This loss was sustained in attempting to reconnoitre the post, preparatory to the advance of the main column, which was headed by his Majesty's 17th regiment, under Colonel Hardyman. Immediately on its arrival, the colonel formed his men, and advanced against the stockade, driving in the party of the enemy who had sallied out on the advance guard; Captain Croker, who led the grenadiers, followed the enemy up the hill, and succeeded in ascending with his own, and two other companies of the regiment, round the left flank of the enemy's work. Thus a position was gained that commanded it entirely, for it was merely a hollow stockade, running along the declivity. The carrying of the work was therefore certain, indeed the enemy were already retreating from it up the hill behind. General Wood, however, thinking it was not possible to carry the hill also, while, without doing so, the stockade itself seemed to

him to be untenable and of no value, ordered a retreat to be sounded, to the great disappointment of the troops, who were flushed with the prospect of a certain and easy victory. The British loss was twenty-four killed, and one hundred and four wounded; besides the two staff-officers above mentioned, Captain M'Dowell, of the artillery, and Lieutenants Pointz and Pickering, of his Majesty's 17th, were severely wounded. The enemy lost a sirdar, named Sooruj Thapa, and many more men than we did; but the retreat gave to them the triumph of a decided victory.

The result of this action, and the bravery the enemy had displayed, left in the general's mind an impression of the inadequacy of his force to the objects assigned to it, which influenced all his future measures: instead of endeavouring to penetrate the hills, he confined his operations to defensive precautions. At his solicitation, parties of irregular horse were added to the force; and, in the end, the 8th native cavalry was sent to assist in scouring the country, and repelling the enemy's incursions. Report magnified the Goorkha army to twelve thousand men; whereas, their regular troops scarcely reached so many hundred. The major-general, however, giving credence to these exaggerated statements, threw up works at Lotun, and put a garrison there to defend the direct road to Gourukpoor, while he himself moved with his main

body to repel an incursion into Nichloul. These measures contributed to make the enemy bold, and produced a disastrous alarm in our own subjects, which, indeed, was not altogether unfounded: for scarce a day passed without some village being plundered and burnt by the Goorkhas. The same state of things continued during the whole of January, February, and even March; and though reinforced by another native battalion, and with further artillery, General J. S. Wood still considered himself too weak to act offensively.

What had passed simultaneously on the Sarun frontier, and to the eastward, unfortunately tended to confirm this impression; and it is time now to advert to the operations in that quarter.

Major Bradshaw, the negociator, remained, during the rains, in military charge of the frontier, and disputed lands of Sumroun, as has before been mentioned. The posts he established were not molested, nor had he much communication of any kind with the Goorkhas until October. By that time, some alarm began to be entertained, at Katmandoo, at the extent of preparation witnessed; wherefore, though determined to concede nothing, they still thought it worth while to attempt to amuse the British government with further negotiation, so as, if possible, to spin out the season of operations in empty discussion. In the course of November, Chundur Seekur Opadheca came down

British government. Accordingly he concentrated his force on the 24th of November; and early in the morning of the 25th, surprised and carried the post; killing the Goorkha commander, Pursuram Thapa, and making prisoner Chundur Seekur Opadheea, with his attendants. Major Bradshaw by this means obtained possession of the Opadheea's instructions, which entered fully into the points at issue between the two governments, and completely showed the object of the deputation to have been merely to gain time. The Goorkhas were very indignant at the seizure of Chundur Seekur, who, they thought, should have been respected as an ambassador, since he had been deputed as such. They forgot, however, that the reception of the individual, or the sanctioning of his deputation, at least, is the thing that plights the faith of the government to whom an agent is accredited, and that this alone gives a claim to the respect of person enjoyed by the envoy of a hostile power, and distinguishes him from a spy. Lieutenant Boileau, who commanded the Major's escort, was wounded in personal conflict with Pursuram Thapa during the affair; and there were, besides, two Sepoys killed, and fourteen wounded. Of the enemy, seventy-five were killed or wounded, and ten soldiers were made prisoners, besides Chundur Seekur's attendants. The Turaec was imme-



diately evacuated by the Goorkhas, and occupied and annexed, *pro tempore*, by proclamation, to the British possessions. Major Bradshaw then established the following posts for its defence, till General Marley should arrive. Captain Hay, with the head-quarters of the Chumparun light infantry, was posted at Baragurhee; Captain Blackney, with a wing of the 2nd battalion, 22nd native infantry, was at Sumunpoor, to the right; while Captain Sibley was stationed, with about five hundred men, at Pursa, on the high road to Hetounda, very considerably to the left of Baragurhee.

General Marley arrived in the Puchroutce Tuppa, with the main army, on the 12th of December. An outpost of Captain Hay's had been driven in on the 7th; and the Goorkhas, though they kept within the cover of the Sâl forest, had shown many symptoms of an actively hostile spirit. Some attempts at poisoning the wells and pools were discovered; and their spies were known to be busy, several having been detected in our camps. General Marley formed his army into three divisions, intending himself to attempt the Bichecakoh and Hetounda pass, with twenty-two hundred men; while Colonel Dick, with about fifteen hundred, took the route of Hurec-hurpoor, to the eastward; and Major Roughsedge, with one thousand two hundred and eighty

men, moved by the Sukteeduree pass and Joor-jooree, which was between the other two, and in advance of Baragurhee. The remainder of the army was to be prepared to support either division that might need it, and to keep open the communications through the forest, till the arrival of the brigade allotted to this duty, which had not yet assembled.

The month of December was spent in devising this plan, and in collecting information preparatory to its execution. In the mean time, the main army was stationary in the Puchroutee Tuppa; and except that Major Roughsedge was at one time, sent to Janikpoor, to the extreme right, the posts above described remained as before. That of Captain Sibley was twenty miles to the left of the main army, which was encamped behind Baragurhee; Captain Blackney was nearly as far to the right,—both without support; and, notwithstanding the length of time that they had occupied the same ground, no substantial works had been thrown up by either officer. This state of things induced the Goorkhas to plan a simultaneous attack on both points.

The main army of the Nipalese was collected at Mukwanpoor, under Colonel Rundhêr Singh; but the forest was in the possession of different parties, who were always on the alert. Rundhêr, having exact intelligence of the positions occupied

by Captains Sibley and Blackney respectively, ordered them both to be attacked on the morning of the 1st of January. Shumsheer Rana commanded the party sent against Pursa; and Surbjeet Thapa, that which attacked Sumunpoor: both were captains, that is, commandants of independent companies or corps in the Goorkha service, and were of high repute with their nation for bravery and conduct.

Captain Blackney was taken completely by surprise by Surbjeet, who came upon him before day-break of the new year. Himself, and his second in command, Lieutenant Duncan, were killed in the first onset; and, before the action had lasted ten minutes, the sepoy, who had but partially run to their arms on the alarm, broke, and fled in every direction. To increase the confusion, the Goorkhas set fire to the tents, having penetrated to the heart of the camp before resistance was offered. Lieut. Strettell, the only surviving officer, seeing things in this state, and perceiving that the day was quite irrecoverable, himself joined the fugitives, and retreated to Gora Sahun with the remnant of the detachment. The communication with Captain Hay had previously been cut off, so that it was not possible to retire on Baragurhee.

Captain Sibley was better on his guard at Pursa, where many circumstances had led him

to expect an attack. He had, indeed, only recently stated his apprehensions to General Marley, who, on the 31st of December, 1814, sent him a reinforcement under Major Greenstreet. The post was more than twenty miles distant, as before mentioned; and the detachment, having marched in the evening, unfortunately encamped on the road. On the morning of the new year, however, hearing the report of artillery in the direction of Pursa, the Major hastened his march, and got within three miles before the firing had ceased. The coming-in of the fugitives then sufficiently explained how the affair had ended. It seems that Shumsheer Rana came to the attack in three columns; Captain Sibley's advance had been thrown very considerably forward, and the ground of the position lay between two nullas, the windings of which allowed the enemy to penetrate sufficiently on either flank, to cut off the communication between the front and rear. The latter quarter, moreover, was left to the defence of about seventy irregular horse, and was therefore a weak point, especially in a night-affair. The attack commenced in front, where it was checked by the advance-guard, commanded by Lieutenant Smith. Finding himself pressed, however, this officer sent to ask of Captain Sibley the reinforcement of a light gun, (a one-and-a-half pounder of new construction,) which was

with the detachment. The Captain brought it forward himself; but when it came, the cartridges were found too large for it to be turned properly to account; and in the mean time, the firing having begun in rear and on both flanks, Captain Sibley found it necessary to return immediately. While on his way back he was wounded, first in the leg, and soon after, mortally, by a shot through the body, from parties of the enemy who had availed themselves of the winding of the nulla, to come close in upon the line of communication with the advance. Lieutenant Smith, the next in rank, was immediately summoned from the front to take the command; and, as the firing in the rear was heavy, he judged it right to carry in his advance-guard. On reaching the line, he found that Shumsheer Rana, while he had thus kept the detachment in play in front and in both flanks, had made his chief attack from the rear; and, having overpowered the irregulars, had penetrated to the officers' tents, and possessed himself of the magazine and bazar. The six-pounder, with the detachment, had been turned towards the rear by Lieutenant Matheson, the artillery-officer; and on the junction of Lieutenant Smith with the advance-guard, all that could be done was to form a circle, in order to keep the enemy at a distance. They had established themselves at the magazine, where there were

some trees and other cover, from behind which they picked off nearly all the artillery-men. Both Lieutenant Smith and Lieutenant Matheson were sensible that, unless the Goorkhas could be dislodged from this point, the day was lost. On proposing, however, to the sepoys to charge and recover it, they showed a disinclination to the undertaking; and kept on firing, nearly at random, until their ammunition was expended. A retreat was then resolved on; and it was effected by crossing one of the nullas at a place where it was not properly fordable, and at a time when the Goorkhas were intent on the plunder. Thus many were saved; but the two guns, the magazine, and stores of every kind, fell a prey to the enemy. Every European of the artillery, except Lieutenant Matheson himself, was either killed or wounded; and our whole loss amounted to one hundred and twenty-three killed, one hundred and eighty-seven wounded, besides seventy-three missing. The detachment originally consisted of about five hundred fighting men; and the proximity of Major Greenstreet, combined with the enemy's eagerness to secure the booty, was what alone saved the wounded and stragglers.

The activity and enterprise shown in these attacks was so unexpected by General Marley, that he began to entertain some apprehension for his train of heavy artillery, which was at the time

coming up from Betia, in the rear. Having therefore strengthened the post of Baragurbee, by ordering Major Roughsedge there from Janik-poor, the general himself made a westward movement to cover his train; moreover, considering his force to be insufficient, he abandoned all idea of penetrating the hills in the manner indicated in his instructions. The two brigadiers, Colonels Dick and Chamberlain, agreed with him in representing the army not to be sufficiently strong for offensive measures; and, perhaps, in this respect they were not wrong at the time.

The Marquess of Hastings was seriously disappointed at all these untoward occurrences. Every nerve was strained to increase the strength of all the divisions, but particularly of this, from which so much was expected. All the military stations of Bengal and Buhar were drained of troops, in order to furnish reinforcements; but it was not so easy to restore confidence to the mind of the commander.

Major-general Marley, notwithstanding the high state of the equipments of his army, and the daily approach of fresh troops, continued inactive during the whole of January; making indeed some marches in the open Turace, but without once venturing into the forest. Repeated orders came from head-quarters, enjoining some effort at offensive measures. When, however, the general began

to deliberate upon the plan he was to adopt, he was distracted by the different opinions entertained by those he was in the habit of consulting, and came, in the end, to no resolution. In the mean time, the enemy, whose army was at Amowa, burnt several villages at no great distance from his camp, and threatened even to attack Baragurhee, where there were upwards of a thousand men in garrison. They raised a stockade at Soofee, a short distance from the post; and were inspired with such confidence from past successes, that orders were issued, under the red seal, for the attack; but the Goorkha commander, Bhugut Singh, had better information than the council at the capital, and wisely refrained. The court, however, not satisfied with his reasons, attributed his conduct to cowardice; and summoning him to the capital, to answer for the disobedience, made him appear at the Durbar in woman's attire, as wanting the spirit and courage of a man. They were soon afterwards undeceived; and on the 7th February removed the post they had so impudently established. But to the mortification of the troops, and discredit of the British general, it had continued thus to insult us for near a month with impunity. Major Roughsedge, indeed, a day or two before the evacuation, sent Captain Hay with a party from Baragurhee to reconnoitre, and, if possible, dislodge the enemy: but that officer, finding his approach inter-



cepted by a morass, and seeing that the post was too strong for his detachment to carry by assault, contented himself with firing a few shrapnell shells from a couple of 6-pounders he had with him, and retired again to Baragurhee.

On the 10th February, General Marley, unable longer to endure the irksomeness of his situation, and feeling strongly the impossibility of answering the expectations of his commander-in-chief, took the sudden and extraordinary resolution of leaving the camp, which was then at Bunjaree Pookureea. He set off before daylight in the morning, without publishing any notification of his intention to the troops, and without taking any means of providing for the conduct of the ordinary routine of command during his absence.

The resolution had previously been formed by Lord Hastings of providing another commander for the Sarun army; but the unadvised step into which General Marley was thus betrayed, seemed to him to require his permanent removal from the staff.

Major-general George Wood was ordered up from the presidency to succeed General Marley; and Colonel Dick, the senior brigadier, assumed and continued to exercise the command until his arrival.

We have now brought up the operations of this campaign to the period when the succession of

disasters had reached its crisis. General Ochterlony alone had not been foiled. He was steadily pursuing his plan by slow and secure manœuvres, but had yet gained no brilliant advantage over his equally cautious antagonist. General Martindell's division had failed three several times: twice before Nalapanee, and the third time in the attempt to take up positions before Jythuk. Moreover, the aggregate loss sustained by this division had amounted to a third of the numbers that originally took the field from Meeruth. The army assembled at Gourukpoor had allowed itself to retire before the enemy under circumstances amounting to a repulse; while, as we have seen, the *Buhar division*, which was thought strong enough to have penetrated to Katmandoo, had lost two detachments of five hundred men each, without an equivalent success of any kind. From the frontier of Oudh to Rungpoor, our armies were completely held in check on the outside of the forest; while our territory was insulted with impunity, and the most extravagant alarms spread through the country. We had lost nothing, indeed, on the Morung frontier; on the contrary, the cooperation of the *Sikhim Raja* had been gained, the communication having been opened by an overture on his part, and a request for a few military stores. In this quarter, also, an attempt made by the Goorkha commander in Morung to cut off a post of ours

stationed at Moodwance, had failed; Lieutenant Foord, of the 9th N. I. having repulsed their night attack, after the assailants had succeeded in firing his tents and baggage. We had several killed, and Lieutenant Thomas, of the 9th, was amongst the wounded, in this affair, which was very creditable to the troops and officers; but as the position was next day evacuated, there was little to boast of in the victory. Major Latter, indeed, was led by the vigorous nature of the attack to solicit the aid of some reinforcements, then on their way to the Sarun army; and thus, by withholding them from their destination, yielded the enemy some advantage from the attack, notwithstanding its failure. The alarms of the civil authorities of Tirhoot had produced a similar diversion in that quarter; and it was not until the end of February, or, indeed, the beginning of March, that the division destined for the main attack was augmented to the full strength proposed for it.

## CHAPTER IV.

## NIPĀL WAR.—FIRST CAMPAIGN.

1815.

Reflections—Successful skirmish on Sarun frontier—General G. Wood takes the command—his inactivity—General J. S. Wood's proceedings in Gourukpoor—Resolution of Governor-general to attack Kumaon—Levies for the purpose—Lieut.-colonel Gardner penetrates by the Kosila—turns the Goorkha position—takes post at Choumou—Major Harsey penetrates to Chumpawut—Colonel Gardner again turns the Goorkha position, and arrives before Almora—Colonel Nicolls sent by the Governor-general to support these operations—Defeat and capture of Major Harsey by Huseedul—his death in an affair with Major Patton's detachment—Attack of the Goorkha positions before Almora—Night sally of the Nipālese defeated—Fall of Almora—Proceedings before Jythuk—Plans of General Martindell—unsatisfactory results—Resolution to cut off the enemy's supplies—Major Richards sent to occupy a post for this purpose—Dislodges the enemy with loss—Jythuk surrendered to General Ochterlony—his further proceedings—Reduction of Ramgurh, &c. by Colonel Cooper—Final operations against Maloun—Lodgment at Ryla and Deothul—Death of Captain Showers—Blugtee Thapa leads a desperate attack on Deothul—his defeat and death—Goorkha chiefs desert Umur Singh—his surrender—Arrangements for disposal of the conquered territory.

THE uniform success which had hitherto attended the Goorkhas produced, in January 1815,

an effect on the public mind in the independent portion of India which is more easily imagined than described. Although jealous, naturally, of our preponderance, and suspicious to a degree of any relinquishment of the pacific policy, the native powers had so little knowledge of the strength and resources of the Goorkhas, that the war at first excited little sensation. It was regarded as a mere affair with a troublesome Raja of the frontier; and, but for the greater magnitude of our preparations, might have been assimilated to the measures taken in 1812 against the Rewa chief. As one check, however, followed another, speculation grew more active, and the events of the campaign became matter of intenser interest; until, at last, more than one of the native courts began seriously to think it was time to prepare to take advantage of circumstances. Runjeet Singh, the Punjab Scikh, kept an army at Lahore, and seemed to menace us in the extreme north-west; while Ameer Khan collected together his Putan battalions, and made an ambiguous offer of their services, from a point only a few marches from Agra. The tone, moreover, assumed in Sindheea's durbar and at Poona was any thing but conciliatory.

It is not our business in this place to explain at length the attitude assumed by the native powers, in consequence of the altered view of our

position presented by these disasters. Suffice it to say, that the intrigues which were set on foot throughout the whole independent portion of India, and which led to such important results a few years afterwards, date their commencement from this period. In proportion as their existence became manifest, it was of course more necessary that we should persevere and conquer the subsisting difficulties in the hills; for the name and character of the government and of the British nation were felt to be committed on the issue.

The Marquess of Hastings never doubted for an instant of his ultimate success in the campaign; and notwithstanding the unfavourable aspect of things at the commencement of 1815, there were abundant sources of consolation, and of a just confidence, to those who looked beyond the surface. Every check our arms had experienced was clearly traceable to a want of due precaution in those who directed the operation, and this was an error that was sure to be remedied as soon as felt. Thus every encounter, even when unfavourable in its result, brought more strength in the lessons of prudence it inculcated, than was detracted in the physical loss sustained. *The soldiers and sepahees of the British army* had, for some time, been unused to war; but though somewhat open to the influence of panic from the strangeness of the scene, and

novelty of their situation amidst the forests and mountains of this extraordinary region, and moreover a little disheartened, at first, to find their best efforts thwarted by this semi-barbarous enemy, they yet showed a wonderful buoyancy of spirit in soon recovering their wonted nerve. The Goorkhas, on the other hand, were abundantly satisfied with repulsing an attack or cutting off an outpost. They never pushed their success beyond this; and were indeed too deficient in military science, as well as in physical means, to assume a superiority in the campaign, or act offensively on a large scale, against any one of our divisions. Their tactics were purely defensive; so much so, that howsoever severely their assailant might suffer from the indiscretion of his first attack, they left him ample time to collect fresh courage, and approach them again with more caution.

To the officers of the Bengal army, in particular, were the lessons of this war salutary; precipitancy and want of caution were qualities bred in them, by an uninterrupted course of easy victory. From the days of Clive to those of Lord Lake, they had only to show themselves, and march straight against their enemy, to ensure his precipitate flight. They naturally carried into the hills the same contempt of the foe which their victories in the plains had engendered; and

were taught only by painful experience to make sufficient allowance for the entire change of circumstances in the new field of action. They had, however, to guard against another influence as prejudicial as over confidence ; and that was, too great distrust and apprehension after the experience of a check. It is doubtful which extreme was, in its results, most injurious to the British cause : but more than one of the officers in high command afforded an example of the facility with which the mind passes from one to the other, as well as of the obstinacy with which distrust maintains its hold when once it finds admittance.

It must be allowed to the Goorkhas that they were an experienced as well as a brave enemy : they had been continually waging war in the mountains for more than fifty years, and knew well how to turn every thing to the best advantage. Caution and judgment were, therefore, more required against them, than boldness of action or of decision ; but most of all, that power of intelligence and discrimination which is never without a resource in circumstances the most unexpected.

It will be perceived that little advance was made in the campaign until we had learnt to turn the same advantages to account against the enemy, by the help of which he foiled us so often at the



commencement; for with all the experience of Indian warfare, combined with the professional science of Europe, our officers found yet something to learn from these Goorkhas. We adopted from them the plan of stockading posts, which the nature of the campaign frequently rendered it necessary to place beyond the limit of prompt support. Had this plan been adopted from the first, the detachments of Captains Sibley and Blackney would have been saved. It was, however, altogether a new thing to the Bengal army; for, from the earliest days, there had never been works thrown up for the defence of an outpost; nor in a war of the plains, could there ever be occasion for such a precaution. Sir David Ochterlony has the merit of having first resorted to this plan,\* and of having adopted it, too, as a resource of prudence which occurred to his own mind, not taught to him by the experience of disaster; as was the case with others. Such, however, was the nature of Umur Singh's positions that they could not have been turned or surrounded, so as to cut off his communications without occupying a large circuit, and throwing out detachments for the purpose at considerable distances from one another; many of which, being necessarily much

\* The first stockade erected after the Goorkha fashion was at Khundnee, where a battalion was left with some irregulars, while the division turned Umur Singh's left, by marching to Nebur.

The same plan was ultimately put in practice at Jythuk, Kumaon, and elsewhere. Its effect will presently be fully shown; but first, it will be proper to mention the result of the efforts made against the more central possessions of the enemy.

The operations of the Sarun and Gourukpoor armies may be dismissed with a very few words. Major-general George Wood was appointed General Marley's successor, and joined the camp on the 20th of February. The very day before his arrival, an event occurred that struck terror into the enemy, and raised the courage of this army to the highest pitch of confidence. Lieutenant Pickersgill, an active officer of the intelligence department, discovered, while out reconnoitering, a party of about five hundred Goorkhas at no great distance from camp. He immediately sent intimation to Colonel Dick, the senior officer, who had assumed the command on General Marley's departure, and himself remained with his personal escort to watch the enemy. Colonel Dick sent a party of irregular horse, under Cornet Hearsey, to strengthen Lieutenant Pickersgill, and himself followed, with all the picquets of the army, in the hope of cutting off this detachment. The Goorkhas, who had taken an advantageous position in a hollow, finding themselves unmolested by Lieutenant Pickersgill, and seeing his small numbers, came to the resolution of attacking him. Just, however, as they debouched

from their position for the purpose, they perceived the cavalry, and the further support that was advancing. Appalled by this, they attempted a precipitate retreat, when Lieutenant Pickersgill, waiting only to be joined by Cornet Hearsey's horse, fell upon them, and cut the whole detachment to pieces. A number of officers of the army had ridden out from camp immediately on its being known that a party of the enemy were in sight, and these joined in the charge, and were mainly instrumental to its success.

The Goorkhas were so intimidated by this result, that they hastily withdrew every position they had established in the forest and Turace; and when General G. Wood arrived next day, the passage of the forest was free to him,—not a Goorkha being to be seen below the hills.

The season was doubtless very far gone for any thing now to be commenced, nevertheless, there remained a month to make some effort to redeem the consequences of his predecessor's inactivity; and the army naturally expected to be led through the forest after the enemy, if not into the passes of the hills. The new General, however, adopted an opinion that the season of the fever had arrived, and that it would be risking the health and efficiency of his fine army, which was now augmented to thirteen thousand four hundred regular troops, were he to attempt to

penetrate the forest. He accordingly contented himself with sweeping its skirt, in a long march eastward to Janikpoor and back again; and thus the season closed, actually without his seeing a single enemy.

In Gourukpoor, Major-general John Sullivan Wood burnt a few of the Goorkha villages in retaliation of their excesses, and marched wherever he heard the enemy were advancing. He was, however, still deceived by false reports, and could not get rid of the impression that his force was too weak to effect any thing against Wuzeer Singh, whom he represented to head-quarters as commanding an army numerically much superior to his own. On the necessity of ascertaining this point, by coming actually into contact with the enemy, being strongly urged by the Commander-in-chief, General Wood was induced at the close of the season, that is, in the month of April, to appear again before Bootwul. He accordingly, on the 17th of that month, drew up his army, and opened a desultory fire against the place for some hours, from his artillery and line. The manœuvre produced no result whatever, though attended with several casualties. The General, however, described it as a reconnoissance calculated to create a diversion by alarming the enemy on this frontier, at the same time that it enabled himself to ascertain that he had not miscalculated the strength of the army

opposed to him. General Wood immediately after this manœuvre laid waste the Goorkha portion of the Turaec, and then retired to cantonments at Gourukpoor.

It is fortunate for the interest of this narrative that the spirit of enterprize was not every where so wanting as in the leaders of the two central divisions. In proceeding westward, it now becomes our duty to relate a series of operations of a very opposite character.

It was ascertained by Lord Hastings, while on his tour through Rohilkhund, that the province of Kumaon, which skirts the north of it, was nearly destitute of troops; the whole Goorkha force having been drawn off to oppose the British divisions operating to the east or west. It seemed to him that a diversion in this quarter, while it would distract the enemy by multiplying the points of attack, would further be of use in preventing any reinforcements from proceeding westward to Jy-thuk. If successful, it might lead to very important results, even to the conquest of the province, and entire separation of the eastern from the western territory: if the contrary, the effect would be produced in other quarters without much loss. It is to be observed that the Kumaonese were known to be disaffected to the Goorkhas, who held them in rigorous subjection, frequently seizing and selling into servitude their women and children, in order

to enforce the most arbitrary exactions. The consequent alienation of the population from their masters, was reckoned upon as likely to aid greatly the projected enterprize.

There were no regular troops that could be spared at this juncture (December); for the threatening tone-and position of several chiefs and associations of the south and north-west required that a warlike attitude should be maintained on both frontiers; whilst the demands for reinforcements to the divisions already in the hills, were so urgent as to require every disposeable man. In order, therefore, not to lose the opportunity, Lord Hastings resolved to avail himself of the warlike population of Rohilkhund, who are Putâns, of a race trained from infancy to the use of the sword and matchlock, and naturally brave and impetuous, though not easily subjected to discipline. Two officers, used to such troops, were accordingly ordered to make levies of Rohillas, to be employed against Kumaon. The persons selected were Lieutenant-colonel Gardner, and Major, then Captain, Hearsey, neither of them of the regular establishment, but both Mahratta officers of great merit, who had come over under the proclamation of Lord Wellesley, on war breaking out with Sindheca in 1802-3. Lieutenant-colonel Gardner had since been retained in command of a corps of police-horse; Major Hearsey had not been em-

ployed in a military capacity for some years, but was the companion of Mr. Moorcroft's adventurous journey across the snowy range to the lake Manusararwa, and had been detained in Kumaon as a prisoner, along with Mr. Moorcroft, on their return, the very year before the war broke out.

To the former officer it was assigned to penetrate from Kasheepoor in the Moradabad district; while the latter was to operate against Chumpawut, to the east of the province, by the passes near Peeleebheet and Khyreegurh, where the Deoha, or Gogra, forces its way into the plains. Both officers received their instructions late in December, and proceeded at once to organize levies.

On the 11th of February, 1815, Lieutenant-colonel Gardner commenced his march from Kasheepoor, accompanied by a civilian, his relation, the Honourable Edward Gardner, to whom was assigned the function of political agent for the province. On the 15th, the force reached the foot of the first passes, and dislodged a Goorkha picquet from Deklee: from hence they could see distinctly a party of Goorkhas stockaded on the summit of Kat-kee-nao, an elevated post which overlooked the entrance of the pass, by the bed of the Kosila; while another party of the enemy occupied the Gurhee, or fort of Kotha, considerably to the right. Having reconnoitered the two positions, the Lieutenant-colonel determined on an attempt to pene-

trate them, so as, if possible, to get between the garrisons and Almora.

On the 16th, in order to put the above design into execution, the Lieutenant-colonel made a short march up the Kosila to Chookum, and next day halted: that the same hill porters who attended the advance, might return to bring up the rest of the baggage and supplies. Heavy rain commenced on the 18th, which soon filled the river, and otherwise impeded the advance. In the evening, however, a party was sent in the direction of Kotha, as if to threaten that post; and at the same time two hundred Rohillas, and one hundred Mewatees marched up the river, to endeavour to seize a strong pass, called Thangura, where the Kosila rushes through a defile commanded by lofty and precipitous mountains on either side. This party, from some misconduct of the guide, did not secure the pass on both sides of the river; but established itself on the hill overlooking it to the south-east. The detachment sent in the direction of Kotha, fell in with the garrison on a hill called Ronseldeli, between the Thangura pass and Kotha. Lieutenant-colonel Gardner, therefore, deeming it necessary to dislodge the enemy from this post without loss of time, moved next morning with five hundred men for the purpose. The object being effected, he turned towards Thangura, and encamped for the night at Ookul Danga, where his party had esta-



blished themselves, as above mentioned, on the evening before. On the 20th, the Goorkhas evacuated Kat-kee-nao, and retired to Googur Gurh, on the right of the Kosila, near Thangura. Kat-kee-nao was immediately secured by a party of observation sent for the purpose the preceding day; and in the evening, the Lieutenant-colonel in person crossed the river, and dislodged the enemy from Googur; thus securing both sides of the important pass of Thangura. On the 21st, seven hundred Rohilla Putans moved forward to Seethee, where they bivouacked, and were next day pushed on to a point where two roads to Almora meet, at a peepul-tree. The more open route, by the valley and town of Boojan, was found occupied by the Goorkha Surdar (Rungelee), with the concentrated garrisons of Kotha and Kat-kee-nao. After a short halt therefore to refresh, the Lieutenant-colonel marched with all haste to seize the Choumou hill, the first steep ascent on the other road; which, leaving the valley, runs along the ridge to the north or left of the direct line of advance. The whole day was consumed in this arduous march; and at the close of it, there was an ascent of three kos to the summit which it was intended to occupy. The fatigue was so great, that only about forty men of the whole number came to the ground; and these were supplied with water from the snow, which lay there in abun-

dance. Early in the morning of the 22d, the enemy were seen making for the same point: they were led by Ungut Surdar, who had just arrived with a reinforcement from Alnora. The party at Choumou were still extremely weak; but they had several standards, of which they made such a display as deterred Ungut from an attack which he seemed to meditate.

It was the 28th of February before all the supplies could be brought up from the rear to Choumou: on that day, however, a further short advance was made to Kampena-ke-danda; whence the enemy were seen in force at Koompoor, a rugged hill in front.

The Lieutenant-colonel, having been obliged to form dépôts and establish garrisons at Katkec-nao, Kotha, and several other places in his rear, thought it prudent to wait here for further reinforcements; and particularly for one thousand Putans raised at Hâpur in the Meeruth district, and now on their way to join him. Little happened in the interim of this halt, with the exception of two skirmishes, on the 6th and 18th of March; both of which ended in a manner highly creditable to the Rohillas. In the former, the Lieutenant-colonel's advanced-guard succeeded in driving back a party of the enemy who ventured to descend from their stockade into the intervening valley of Tarakot; and in the second

affair, which was rather more serious, between six and seven hundred men being engaged on either side, the Putans made a resolute charge, and put to the rout a body of the enemy of equal strength, who ventured again to the same ground.

The Lieutenant-colonel, while he thus advanced by the Kosila, had kept a party in front of the direct route from Rohilkhund by Bummouree and Bheem Tâl; the commandant, however, attempted nothing, and was in the end ordered to join the main body.

Major Hearsey, having completed his levies, at the same time with Colonel Gardner, advanced also, in February, from Peeleecheet, and penetrated by the Kalee, or western Gogra, to Chumpawut, without meeting any opposition. The population showed some disposition to declare in his favour; so, posting half his force to guard the important passes of the Kalee, he began to think of co-operating with Lieutenant-colonel Gardner, by an advance to Almora from the east.

In this view he moved upon Kootulgurh, a very strong fort; but which some information received as to the state of its supplies, induced the Major to think must soon yield to a blockade. The month of March was spent in these operations.

In the mean time, Colonel Gardner being joined by the men from Hâpur, on the 22nd of March, again out-generated the Goorkha commander, and established himself in his rear, and even within sight of Almora. The same night that the reinforcement joined, a strong detachment under Mohun Singh, a native commandant of known courage and steadiness, was sent, by a circuitous route through the valleys to the right, to seize the southernmost point of a ridge immediately facing Almora, where was a temple called Sheeo-ka Devce. On the morning of the 23d, in order to draw off the enemy's attention from this operation, a demonstration was made of attacking Koompoor in front. The movement was thus so well concerted, that it was not till twelve o'clock in the day that the Goorkhas made the discovery of its object, by seeing the Rohillas taking up their position at the temple behind them. The Lieutenant-colonel, satisfied at the success of the operation, waited till the following day to see its effect on the enemy. Early in the morning he advanced with the intention of attacking, or at least turning, the left flank of the Koompoor position, in order to follow to Sheeo-ka Devce. The Goorkhas, however, moved at the same time; and setting fire to their stockade, hastened by Reonce to Kutarmul, two points on the same ridge with

Sheco-ka Devce. The Lieutenant-colonel followed by the same route; but the want of porters prevented his reaching Reonee till the 25th, and a halt of a couple of days was then necessary, to bring up the guns and supplies. On the 28th he marched in two columns upon Kutarmul; and as he approached, the Goorkha commander, finding himself between Mohun Singh's detachment and the main body, did not think it prudent to continue on the same ridge, but crossed the Kosi, and posted himself on the declivities between Almora and that river, leaving the Lieutenant-colonel free to occupy the ground on the right bank from Reonee to Sheco-ka Devce. Thus had Lieutenant-colonel Gardner, by sheer dexterity, and without bloodshed, made an effectual opening to the heart of the province of Kumaon. His conciliatory conduct, and that of the Political Agent, had succeeded in effectually gaining the natives; so much so, that the bazar of his camp seldom failed to be supplied from the villages in the hills; and the intercourse opened and maintained furnished certain intelligence of all the enemy's projects.

In the end of March, Lord Hastings, seeing the state of things here, determined on supporting the Lieutenant-colonel; and following up his successes, by sending a force of regular in-

fantry and artillery, capable of subduing all further opposition. He selected Colonel Jasper Nicolls, at the time Quartermaster-general of the King's troops in India, for this important service; *and on the 23rd of March, placed under his command a force of two thousand and twenty-five firelocks, composed of the 1st battalion 4th N. I., under Captain Faithful; the 2d battalion 5th N. I. under Major Patton; and part of a battalion formed of grenadier companies, and then employed in Gurlwal. Ten pieces of artillery of different kinds were added from Moradabad. The state of the operations before Jythuk, combined with the assurance that the tranquillity of Central India would not be disturbed this season, were the circumstances that enabled the Governor-general to devote the troops of his regular army to this service now; though two months earlier he had not deemed it safe to spare them.*

On the 5th of April, Colonel Nicolls entered the hills with his advance, and hastened to join Lieutenant-colonel Gardner at Kutarmul. On his way he heard of the entire defeat and capture of Major Hearsey, and of the reduction of all the posts he had established to guard the line of the Kallee or Surjoo; by which names the western branch of the Gogra is here known. It seems that the court of Katmandoo, finding all secure for the

season to the eastward, determined on an effort to succour Almora, and eventually relieve Jythuk. For this purpose they ordered a battalion to cross the Kalee into Kumaon, and gave the command of the force to Hustee-dul, the chief then governing the province of Dotee. Having strengthened himself by collecting all the detachments of his province, this chief crossed the Kalee, on the 31st of March, at Khusnot Ghat. Major Hearsey had attempted the defence of a wider line along this river than his force justified, besides being still engaged on the blockade of Kootulgurh. His men were thus too much detached for his whole force to be made available in the emergency; nevertheless, he hastened to meet the enemy with the few men he had at Chumpawut, and fell in with him on the first day's march. The Rohillas, being raw levies, deserted Major Hearsey after the first fire; and he was wounded, and made prisoner. None of the positions he had garrisoned held out afterwards; but the men hastened back again to the plains with the utmost terror and expedition. Little better was to be expected from new levies, upon the loss of their commander; the defeat was, however, of bad effect in the impression it left on the inhabitants of the province; and had not the support been on its way to Colonel Gardner, its influence on the raw troops of his force might, perhaps, have ren-

dered necessary the relinquishment of all the advantages gained. It may be observed here, that in every action between the Gookha regulars and Rohilla Nujcebs, or other similar levies, the former were always victorious. Hence the merit of *Colonel Gardner's plan*, under which, though always advancing to his object, he avoided committing his men, except in skirmishes where he had a decided superiority or under circumstances in which the enemy did not think it prudent to attack him, is the more conspicuous.

Colonel Nicolls, on being informed of the defeat and capture of Major Hearsey, hastened to effect a junction with *Lieutenant-colonel Gardner*, and reached him a day or two before *Hustee-dul* arrived with his prisoner at *Almora*. The latter event was announced by a salute which was both heard and seen from the *British camp*. On the 23d of April, *Hustee-dul* again left the town, with a considerable detachment, upon some expedition, the object of which was not immediately apparent. Colonel Nicolls, seeing the movement, despatched Major Patton, with his battalion, the 2d of the 5th N. I., in the direction of *Gunnath*, a station about fifteen miles north of *Almora*, on which *Hustee-dul* appeared to be marching. The routes of the two detachments brought them in sight, and close upon one another, before they were well aware. They were both marching up the



same eminence, and it was a contest which should seize it. Hustee-dul first gained the summit; but the British advance-guard, under Lieutenant Webster, of the 5th N. I., attacked him before he had time to make any arrangement for his defence. He was dislodged with *considerable loss*; and in the action received a ball in his temple, which secured the victory to us. Our loss was only two killed, and twenty-five wounded, including Ensign Blair, severely.

Hustee-dul was an active and brave officer, of high reputation in his nation, and his loss was severely felt in Almora.

Colonel Nicolls determined, on the return of Major Patton, to avail himself of the alarm he judged the late defeat would occasion; and on the 25th, at one P. M., he led the 1st battalion 4th N. I. in person across the Kosila, followed by Lieutenant-colonel Gardner and his irregulars, in order to effect a lodgement on the Sectolce heights, where the enemy were posted. Having reached the height and taken measures to secure the possession of it, he thought he observed symptoms of alarm in the garrison of a stone breast-work before him, and immediately in front of the town of Almora. He was hence tempted to try an assault, without waiting to bring up his guns to breach the walls, which would have occasioned a considerable loss of time. The assault was led by Captain

Faithful in person; and the redoubt was entered first, through an embrasure, by Lieutenant Wight, who fell immediately, severely wounded by a Goorkha chief. Captain Faithful followed at the head of some grenadiers, and saved his brother officer by cutting down the man; when the rest fled, leaving the redoubt in our possession. All the stockades of the ridge were carried or evacuated; and the enemy were pursued into the town of Almora; leaving the Colonel to make his dispositions for the night.

The Nipålese were not, however, disposed to resign the possession of these heights, which communicated directly with the town, without a further struggle; and accordingly, at about eleven in the night, having sent a detachment secretly round, they attacked and carried our most northerly post, though stockaded and defended by a piquet of regulars, under Lieutenant Costly, of the 1st battalion of 4th N. I. A party of the flank battalion, under Lieutenants Brown and Winfield, immediately moved to the support of the post; and with the aid of a ghole of irregulars, under Colonel Gardner in person, the place was recovered, but not without a hard struggle. The firing in this quarter was the signal for a general sortie from the fort; but for this Colonel Nicolls was prepared, and the enemy were driven back with loss; after which they confined themselves to a little de-

tached firing. We lost in this affair an officer, Lieutenant Tapley of the 27th, attached to the grenadier battalion, besides many sepoy and irregulars killed and wounded.\* The next day the guns were brought up, and a position taken about seventy yards only from the fort of Almora. Bumsah Chountra, the governor of the province, seeing his situation desperate, proposed in the evening of the following day a suspension of arms, preparatory to a negotiation of the terms of surrender.

The armistice being granted, the Nipálese wounded officers came boldly into our camp to solicit surgical aid. They further stated, without reserve, their extreme want of supplies, and allowed us to examine the walls and defences of the place; thus exhibiting a frankness and confidence not a little remarkable in their circumstances. In arranging the terms of capitulation, their main stand was made to obtain an article permitting five hundred men, destined to the service by the government at Katmandoo, to proceed westward, to

\* Including the operations in the day-time, the loss in the attack and maintenance of the Seetolee position, was one officer, Lieutenant Tapley, twenty-nine sepoy, and twenty irregulars killed; two officers (Lieutenants Wight and Purvis, of the 4th native infantry), ninety-eight sepahcees, and sixty-one irregulars wounded. Making a total of two hundred and eleven killed and wounded.

reinforce Runjoor Singh at Jythuk. This, of course, was resisted; but they did not give up the point until a renewal of hostilities was threatened, if the surrender were not concluded by a given hour. At last, on the 27th of April, a formal convention was signed by Colonel Nicolls and the Honourable Edward Gardner, on one side, and Chountra Bumsah, Ungut Kajee, and Chamoo Bundaree, on the other.

In this the surrender of the province of Kumaon, with all its fortified places, was stipulated; also the retirement of all troops and officers of the Goorkha government, within ten days, to the east of the Kalee; the British engaging to furnish carriage to aid the transportation of private property. Major Hearsey's unconditional release was further stipulated. These articles were faithfully executed; and Colonel Nicolls, having accompanied the Goorkha troops to the ghats of the Kalee, disposed his force in the best manner for the defence of that line, against any future attempt of the Nipålese to molest our possession of the province.\*

Let us now return to the events of the campaign further west. It has been stated that Major-

\* During the operations above explained, the Goorkhas made an irruption from Dottee into Khyreegurh, in the plains; but were defeated and driven back by a detachment under Captain Buchanan, sent from Futchgurh by Lord Hastings.

general Martindell, after the failures of December, was so firmly persuaded of the inadequacy of his force to do any thing against the position of Jythuk, that he lay long inactive at Nahn. In the interim, several reinforcements reached him; and the instructions of his Commander-in-chief continually urged the recommencement of active operations. Towards the beginning of February, Major Kelly was detached from Nahn, with a light battalion, to occupy a post on the same ridge that Major Ludlow had moved upon in December. He established himself without opposition at Nounce; and on the 12th of the month, being supported by Major Ludlow and his battalion, he advanced to a point called the Black Hill. This post being within the range of heavy artillery, it was resolved by the Major-general to carry up 18-pounders, and batter the first of the enemy's stockades. The side of the hill was therefore prepared for the purpose, and, by great exertions, guns and stores were dragged up the precipitous part of the ascent. The operation excited the astonishment of the enemy, who came out every where to see the wonder, but made no attempt to prevent it. In the mean time, Runjoor Singh's communications were left quite open; and besides the reinforcement carried to him by Bulbhudur Singh, others were continually joining. On the 17th of February, intelligence reached camp of a party being on its way to

Jythuk, from the Jumna. Lieutenant Young was accordingly detached with a body of irregulars to intercept it. Not finding the enemy at the point expected, he came back on the 19th; but more correct intelligence being then obtained, he again marched with all the irregulars in camp, amounting to upwards of two thousand men, and found the Goorkhas in a place called Chumalgurh. Not thinking it right to trust his raw troops with an immediate attack of the position, and relying on his great superiority of number, he proceeded to post detachments where most they could annoy the enemy, and cut off the communication with Jythuk.

The whole number of the Goorkhas did not amount to two hundred fighting men: but seeing their situation desperate, they called a council, and adopted the resolution to die bravely together\*. Having thus prepared themselves, they advanced, and delivering their fire, charged, sword in hand, the nearest post of the irregulars. These unfortunately gave way immediately, and were pursued, in the utmost confusion, to the next post, where the panic quickly spread; until the whole party took to flight without attempting any resistance, in spite of the utmost efforts of Lieutenant Young to induce them to face the enemy.

\* Ujumba Punt was the leader of this party.

This unlooked-for result of their intrepidity enabled the Goorkhas to continue their march to Jythuk, without further opposition; and gave them so much confidence, that they never afterwards failed to attack a post of irregulars whenever placed within their reach; and even when stockaded, they generally succeeded.

The 18-pounders, from the Black Hill, were opened against the first stockade on the 17th of March; and on the 20th a battery was erected in a more advanced position. The effect of one day's fire of this last, was to level with the ground the whole stockade; but the Major-general, instead of following up the advantage by an immediate attack, which all the troops were eagerly expecting, came now to the conclusion that his present plan was injudicious; for that, if carried, the post could not be maintained against the force Runjoor Singh could bring up from behind it. It would thus seem, that with an European regiment and a force of at least five thousand of the Company's regular army, the Major-general yet thought it dangerous to take a step that might bring on a general action with an enemy, who had never more than two thousand five hundred men at the utmost. This excess of caution was an unfortunate consequence of the early disasters above related; but it was a feeling that none of the officers or troops of the division participated

with the general, and that, under the circumstances, was quite unwarranted. The vacillation of mind exhibited in the adoption and abandoning of these different plans, was strongly remarked upon by the Commander-in-chief. It seemed to him that the practicability of reducing the stockades by battering them in succession, could as well have been determined upon before bringing up the guns, and wasting so much labour and ammunition; in which case, more than a month would have been saved for the prosecution of any other plan. *It is painful, however, to dwell upon the sources of such disappointments.*

*Upon relinquishing the hope of gaining any useful end by the heavy artillery, the Major-general, on the 26th of March, came to the resolution of surrounding Runjoor by detachments, and thus reducing him by blockade and starvation. General Ochterlony, he perceived, had effected every thing by directing his efforts against the supplies of his antagonist; and there could be little doubt that the same system must be efficacious at Jythuk, though the end of March was rather late in the season to commence on such an operation. In execution of this new plan, Major Richards was sent, on the 1st of April, to seize a post on the eastern ridge, connected with Jythuk. He marched with two battalions, the 1st of the 13th, and 1st of the 15th N. I. and some irregulars. Having made a consi-*



derable circuit, to bring his detachment to a place where the ascent could be made with artillery, and without much separation of the files, he advanced cautiously to gain the top of the ridge, which was occupied by the Góorkhas in considerable force. The enemy allowed the Major to come within forty yards before delivering his fire. The post was, however, overpowered without much loss; and Major Richards followed up his advantage along the ridge to a point called Punjab-ka-Teeba, or Punchul; where the Goorkas seemed disposed to make a more serious stand. The Major halted, to allow time for the rear companies to close up; and then attacked this post in two columns; and carrying it, proceeded immediately to make preparations to stockade it against an effort to recover it, that he expected Runjoor Singh would make with his whole force. The enemy were, however, deterred by the state of preparation they witnessed, and by their past ill-success; and left Major Richards full leisure to establish himself securely.

In the above affair the Goorkha commander, Ujumba Punt \*, was taken prisoner; and of thirteen hundred men that composed his force, one hundred and seven were killed, and about two

\* This was the same man, who with two hundred, or one hundred and fifty Goorkhas, defeated the irregulars under Lieutenant Young;—*Vide above, page 159.*

hundred and fifty wounded. The British loss was trifling, being only seven killed and twenty-nine wounded, including two officers. On the 16th of April, Captain Wilson marched to occupy a point midway between Major Richards and the headquarters of the Major-general: besides which, several other points had, in the interim, been seized and stockaded in execution of the plan of blockade. Notwithstanding, indeed, the lateness of the period at which it was adopted, there can be but little doubt that the operation would have been effectual in reducing Jythuk, had not its fall been hastened by other means.

The glory of receiving the surrender of Jythuk was reserved for Sir David Ochterlony, whose further successes alone remain to be recorded.

We left this officer in position on the further side of the Maloun ridge, with Colonel Arnold at Rutungurb, between the enemy and Belaspoor, while Colonel Cooper was left to reduce the forts of the Ramgurb range. The first of these attacked was Ramgurb itself, which, after great exertions in dragging up the heavy artillery, was breached at last on the 16th of February. The garrison capitulated for themselves, and for Joorjoorce, and were allowed to march out with the honours of war. The two commanders, however, on joining Umur Singh at Maloun, were punished with the loss of their

ears and noses ;—an act of savage discipline not perhaps wholly unmerited by the individuals ; but considering Umur Singh's circumstances, not very judicious. Each of the forts had a garrison of one hundred men ; and Joorjooree would have taken some days to reduce, even admitting that Ramgurh could have held out no longer.

It was the 10th of March before Colonel Cooper could bring a battery to bear on Taragurh, the next place he attacked. The breach was practicable the following day, and the garrison evacuated the fort in the night. Chumba, on the same ridge, was next attacked ; and by the 16th of March, after a day's battering, the garrison hung out the white flag, and surrendered prisoners of war. The chiefs expressed alarm lest their families should suffer from Umur Singh's severity ; to deceive him, therefore, the Colonel ordered the guns to continue firing occasionally with blank cartridges ; while some of the prisoners were released, that they might endeavour to bring away the families from Maloun.

The whole of the strong forts in the rear being thus reduced and occupied, Colonel Cooper followed the main army, to take part in the last operations against Maloun. By the 14th of April all was prepared for a combined movement, the plan of which the General had for some time been maturing.

The immediate object was to effect a lodgment within the series of heights that formed Umur Singh's present position. His line stretched between the stone forts of Maloun and Soorujgurh, presenting to the view a series of connected peaks more or less abrupt, and each crowned with a stockade, excepting two, which had the names of Ryla peak and Deothul. The former was conveniently situated for operations against Soorujgurh, which it would effectually cut off from Maloun; the latter was in the very heart of the Goorkha position, and not one thousand yards from Maloun itself. It was to be expected that the whole force of the Goorkhas would oppose the occupation of Deothul, which was the main object of attack. General Ochterlony reckoned, however, that even if he failed there, the possession of Ryla would still be a great advantage: and that the movement on both points at the same time, would contribute to distract the enemy. To assist the enterprize further, a diversion was planned by other detachments, which were directed to march right upon the enemy's cantonment under the walls of Maloun.

It will be proper to explain this movement more in detail. Five columns altogether were put in motion, besides detachments for the diversion, and the following was the part assigned to each. The first from Pulta, one of the posts opposed to Soorujgurh, on the enemy's extreme right, con-

sisted of two light companies of the 19th N. I. under *Lieutenant Fleming*, who, attended by a strong party of irregulars, was to make a secret night movement on *Ryla*, and there show a light as a signal for the movement of the other columns. Immediately on seeing it, *Captain Hamilton* was to march on the same point, with his own and *Lieutenant Lidlie's* detachments, assembled for the purpose at *Jynugur*; while a grenadier battalion from head-quarters, under *Major Innes*, moved simultaneously in the same direction. This force was destined to support *Lieutenant Fleming*, and to occupy *Ryla*; while *Major Lawrie*, with the 2d battalion of the 7th N. I. from his position at *Kalee*, to the right, and *Lieutenant-colonel Thompson*, with the 2d battalion of the 3d N. I. from *General Ochterlony's* head-quarters, were to lead each separate columns on *Deothul*, and two field-pieces were attached to the latter, for the defence of the position when occupied.\* Two smaller detachments, one led by *Captain Bowyer*, and the other by *Captain Showers*, and consisting each of three companies, besides irregulars, were to move from opposite sides direct upon the *Goorkha* cantonment, in order to create the diversion, above alluded to, in aid of the occupation of *Deothul*.

\* These two columns were to wait for daylight in the bed of the *Gumrora*, in order that their ascent of the heights might be simultaneous.

Ryla was occupied by Lieutenant Fleming in the course of the night of the 14th ; and at sight of the signal, by which it was preconcerted that notice of this event should be communicated, Captain Hamilton and Major Innes marched on the same point, and in the course of the morning established themselves, without meeting any opposition. The signal being repeated from a conspicuous station behind the General's camp, the two columns under Colonel Thompson and Major Lawrie marched immediately to the Gumrora, and waiting there till daylight, moved from opposite directions on Deothul. They just met at the last ascent, and pushed on together to seize the point, at about ten in the morning; when a contest commenced as severe as any in which our native troops have ever been engaged. As the head of the first column approached the summit of Deothul, a picquet of not more than twenty or thirty Goorkhas charged fearlessly on the advance-guard, and occasioned a check that was near proving fatal to the success of the movement. The exertions of the officers, however, particularly of Major Lawrie, restored the men to a sense of duty, and they advanced boldly and dislodged the enemy as well from Deothul as from other posts in the immediate neighbourhood. The day was spent in desultory fighting about the position; and every exertion was made in the evening and during the night to throw up defences about Deothul, in the

conviction that the struggle for the post had yet to come.

The Goorkhas had been occupied during the day in opposing and pursuing the detachments of Captains Showers and Bowyer, which had thus completely succeeded in withdrawing their attention from the main object. The former officer marched from Rutungurh, and early in the day found himself within the stockades of the enemy. He was of a peculiarly chivalrous spirit, and thinking he had instilled the same ardour and fearlessness into his men, urged them to trust only to the bayonet, and in this view he commanded them not to load. As the column approached the cantonments, a body of Goorkhas came boldly down upon them ; when Captain Showers stepped forward to lead the projected charge : the sepoy, however, not being on ground where they could form readily, proved unequal to the trial, and the Captain was left alone to stand the shock. A personal combat ensued with the Goorkha chief, and he was slain by the Captain, who happened to be an excellent swordsman. This brave officer was, however, shot dead immediately after, which completed the confusion. The detachment fled precipitately as far as Lag Village, and were pursued by the Goorkhas ; this spot being, however, open, the men were rallied by Lieutenant Rutledge ; and having had time to load, offered a successful oppo-

sition, and again assumed the offensive.\* Captain Bowyer, in the mean time, had marched from Kalee at daybreak, and reached the point assigned to him as a post of observation by seven in the morning; there he was attacked, and maintained himself till noon; when perceiving the entire failure of Captain Showers, and thus seeing the impossibility of converting the *feint* into any thing more beneficial, he commenced a retreat in the face of the enemy. The retreat was executed with field-day precision, one half of the detachment retiring to position, and the other following under cover of its fire. The Goorkhas, who had anticipated confusion, and the destruction of the column, continued engaged in a fruitless pursuit during a great part of the day, but could effect nothing beyond occasioning a few casualties. They were thus effectually drawn away from the more important post at Deothul, which was in the mean time occupied and secured, as we have before mentioned.

The night was one of anxiety to both parties. Bhugtee Thapa, or more properly Bukhtyar Thapa, Umur Singh's best officer, saw from Soorujgurh the serious character of the operation intended; he accordingly left that place, with a chosen band, to

\* The author of the *Sketches of the Goorkha War* states that the flight and pursuit were continued till arrested by the artillery of Rutungurh, which opened on the pursuers.



take part in the struggle which impended. The absolute necessity of dislodging the British from Deothul, was but too apparent to Umur Singh and his council. There were, however, two complete battalions now established there, besides irregulars; and two pieces of field artillery had been brought up and placed in position, to say nothing of the works hastily prepared. The elite of the Goorkha army were in this emergency collected; and two thousand, more than could well operate at once on the broken ground of the ridge, were placed under the personal command of Bhugtee Thapa, for the attack of Deothul next morning.\* Umur Singh himself also resolved to appear in the field with his youngest son, the only one with him, in order to encourage and support the attack.

Agreeably to the arrangement thus determined upon, the British position at Deothul was attacked at once on all sides where it was accessible, just at daybreak on the morning of the 16th of April. The Goorkhas came on with furious intrepidity, so much so, that several were bayoneted or cut to pieces within our works. Umur Singh stood all

\* This officer assured Umur Singh that he would return victorious, or not at all; and he gave notice to his two wives to prepare for their suttee, as he had little hope of surviving. They both sacrificed themselves on the funeral pile on which his body was burnt the next day.

the while just within musquet range, with the Goorkha colours planted beside him; while Bhugtee was every where exciting the men to further efforts. The Goorkhas particularly aimed at gaining possession of our guns; and directed their fire with so much effect against the artillery men, that at one time three officers, Lieutenant Cartwright, Lieutenant Hutchinson of the engineers, and Lieutenant Armstrong of the pioneers, were, with one artillery man, the only persons remaining to serve them. The British commandant at Ryla, perceiving the desperate nature of the struggle at Deothul, sent a reinforcement, with ammunition, which arrived very opportunely. After a contest of two hours' continuance without intermission, the Goorkhas being observed to slacken their efforts, it was resolved to assume the offensive, and drive them back. Major Lawrie led this charge, and Bhugtee Thapa being killed in it, the enemy was every where put to flight, and the victory decided.

There were two hundred and thirteen killed and wounded on the side of the British\*, and the enemy left above five hundred men on the ground about the post of Deothul. In the

\* Lieut. Bigot died of his wounds, and Major Lawrie was slightly hurt. Lieutenant Gabb, light battalion, and Laugel Dalgurns, of the 2d N. I. were the other officers wounded in this part of the operations.

course of the day they sent to request permission to seek the body of Bhugtee Thapa ; and it was found, covered with wounds, close to the foot of our defences. General Ochterlony ordered it to be wrapped in shawls, and delivered to Umur Singh, in order to testify the respect his bravery had excited.

The total loss incurred in the operations of the 15th and 16th of April was, two officers, three Soobadars, four Naiks, and fifty-two Sepoys killed; and five\* officers, one sergeant, and two hundred and eighty-seven men wounded.

Taken altogether, this approached more nearly to a general action than any event that occurred in the campaign ; and it was a proud triumph to the officers of the Indian army, to have achieved so complete a victory on ground which gave such great advantages to the enemy, and with numbers so nearly equal,—for not one half of Sir David's army was engaged.

The dispositions for the operation exhibited wonderful skill, and the precision with which the movement of the different detachments was calculated, reflects the greatest credit on those who collected the intelligence, and furnished the materials on which the plan was combined. Lieutenant Lawtie of the engineers was the most

\* The only officer not already named, is Lieutenant Spellessy of the 7th N. I. attached to the detachment under Capt. Showers.

valuable instrument of those to whose exertions the General was indebted on the occasion. This young officer had, as field-engineer, directed the operations of the late successful sieges, under Colonel Cooper; and there had not been a movement or enterprize undertaken by the division, since it took the field, that had not benefited by his professional zeal, activity, and penetration. His ardour in examining all the routes by which the Maloun position was to be approached, with a view to provide against every possible contingency or mishap, led him into exertions that produced a fever of which he died in the beginning of May\*; but he had the satisfaction of first seeing the completion of the triumph he so essentially contributed to secure.

General Ochterlony, who considered nothing done while any thing remained, set himself immediately to prepare a road for heavy artillery to Deothul; and to straiten Maloun, by closing his positions round it. The Goorkhas likewise concentrated themselves about Maloun, with-

\* General Ochterlony published a general order on the occasion of the death of this officer, in which he spoke in high commendation of his services and useful talents. The officers of the division, uniting in esteem of so great a merit, went into mourning for him, and further described the erection of a marble monument to his memory. It now stands in the cathedral church of St. John at Calcutta—a proud record to have been earned by so young an officer.

posts for the Nusecree battalions. The principle adopted was, to place all the chiefs in precisely the same condition as they stood with respect to each other before the appearance of the Goorkhas; and to leave them each in the free enjoyment of his own, under the general protection of the British government. The following statement exhibits the names and relative importance of the principal chiefs, whom this arrangement placed in a state of protected dependence. Mr. Fraser, the Political Agent attached to the force of General Martindell, was, in the first instance, invested with the duty of introducing this system; and for that purpose, some time before the surrender of Jythuk, he undertook a journey into Gurhwal, and afterwards made a tour of the principal places in the hills, where he was instrumental in confirming the Rajas and Thakoors in the assurance of their security, and in reconciling them to the new state of things. Ultimately, Gurhwal being restored to its Raja, the superintendence of the affairs of all the western chiefs was vested in Sir David Ochterlony; on whose part a military Assistant was appointed to reside at Subathoo.

# NAMES OF THE RAJAS AND THAKOORS,

AS ESTABLISHED AND TAKEN UNDER PROTECTION IN 1815,

WITH AN ESTIMATE OF THEIR REVENUE.

Rupees,  
Per Ann.

*Kuhlor, or Belaspoor, extending on both sides of the  
Sutlej, but the eastern part only is guaranteed.*

Raja Mohachund - - - - - 60000 .

*Hindor, or Plaseea.*

Raja Ram Surun Sein.—Hill territory 15015; in  
the plains 30000 rupees - - - - - 45000

*Sirmoor.—Nahn the capital.*

Futteh Prokash Singh, infant son of Kurum Pro-  
kash; who was set aside for profligacy and ty-  
ranny, and died in 1816. Jounsar and Bhawur,  
two Pergunnas east of the Tonse, have been re-  
tained by the British - - - - - 80000

*Busakur.—Capital Rampoor.*

Raja Muhindur Singh, a minor son of Oogur Singh,  
deceased; Teekum Das is the Vizeer or manager.  
The Raja pays a tribute of 15000 rupees - - - - - 80000

*Keonthul.*

This is the largest of the Bara Thakoraees; Suba-  
thoo was reserved from it as a British station; and  
there being no family that had any claim to resto-  
ration, the territory was given to the Seikh Raja  
of Puteeala in reward for his services - - - - - 40000

*Bogul.—Capital Urkee.*

Rana (name unknown) - - - - -

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